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Abstract
Security experts recommend password managers to help users generate, store, and enter
strong, unique passwords. Prior research confirms that managers do help users move towards
these objectives, but it also identified usability and security issues that had the potential to
leak user data or prevent users from making full use of their manager. In this dissertation, I
set out to measure to what extent modern managers have addressed these security issues
on both desktop and mobile environments. Additionally, I have interviewed individuals to
understand their password management behavior.
I begin my analysis by conducting the first security evaluation of the full password
manager lifecycle (generation, storage, and autofill) on desktop devices, including the creation
and analysis of a corpus of 147 million generated passwords. My results show that a small
percentage of generated passwords are weak against both online and offline attacks, and that
attacks against autofill mechanisms are still possible in modern managers. Next, I present a
comparative analysis of autofill frameworks on iOS and Android. I find that these frameworks
fail to properly verify webpage security and identify a new class of phishing attacks enabled
by incorrect handling of autofill within WebView controls hosted in apps. Finally, I interview
users of third-party password managers to understand both how and why they use their
managers as they do. I find evidence that many users leverage multiple password managers to
address issues with existing managers, as well as provide explanations for why password reuse
continues even in the presence of a password manager. Based on these results, I conclude
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Despite the well-established problems facing password-based authentication, it continues
to be the dominant form of authentication used on the web [11]. Because passwords that
are difficult for an attacker to guess are also hard for users to remember, users often create
weaker passwords to avoid the cognitive burden of recalling them [18, 53]. In fact, with the
increase in the number of passwords users are required to store, they often reuse passwords
across websites [17, 26, 50, 66]. Herley points out that this rejection of security advice by
users is rational when the low percentage of users affected by breaches is contrasted with
the effort required [35]. However, the number of data breaches is on the rise [55], and this
situation leaves many users vulnerable to exploitation.
Password managers provide a mechanism for users to create, store, and fill strong, unique
passwords. Because managers remember users passwords for them, users can generate strong
passwords without the fear of forgetting or losing them. Most managers provide a generation
pop-up dialogue next to password fields to encourage users to create strong passwords and
periodically remind users if they still have weak or reused passwords. Moreover, research
confirms that managers do reduce password reuse among their users [41].
However, prior work identifies security challenges present in managers. The password
autofill functionality may allow attackers to steal or phish users’ credentials [39, 58, 60].
Additionally, password vaults occasionally leave users’ credentials or data vulnerable to
attack [29, 21], including unencrypted metadata and side channel leakage from encrypted
information. No prior work examines the security of password generation in managers.
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Because no prior work has analyzed the entire password lifecycle (generation, storage,
autofill) in password managers, I begin my dissertation by examining the security of the
full lifecycle in desktop managers. I find that autofill is commonly vulnerable to XSS based
attacks, which in some cases allow an attacker to scrape all of a user’s credentials at once.
The autofill related security vulnerabilities I identify on desktop raise questions about the
state of autofill security on mobile, where there is OS support for autofill that is not available
on the desktop and where autofill occurs in a wider variety of contexts. I continue my
dissertation by evaluating the security of these mobile autofill frameworks. What I find
is that mobile autofill frameworks overall are less secure than their desktop counterparts,
leaving users vulnerable to phishing attacks inside WebView and failing to provide a secure
mapping between websites and apps. In addition to these concerns, there are also many
inconsistencies in behavior that impact usability. To better understand the usability issues
facing password management generally, I conduct a cross-device observational interview of
password manager users. My analysis of these interviews, which utilizes grounded theory,
identifies five key processes describing manager usage, including why and how users often
use multiple managers simultaneously and a correlation between problems with cross-device
password entry and password reuse among manager users. Overall, my dissertation reveals a
need for browsers and OSes to provide additional support for password management, as well
as for managers to address usability concerns that lead to password reuse.
In Chapter 3, I provide details about my security evaluation of the entire password
lifecycle (generation, storage, and autofill) in desktop managers. For password generation, I
evaluate a corpus of 147 million passwords generated by the studied password managers to
determine whether they exhibit any non-randomness that an attacker could leverage. My
results find several issues with the generated passwords, the most severe being that a small
percentage of shorter generated passwords are weak against online and offline attacks (shorter
than 10 characters and 18 characters, respectively). I also replicate earlier work examining
the security of password storage [29] and autofill [39, 58, 60]. While password managers
have improved in the past five years, there are still significant security concerns, especially
regarding autofill in the browser.
2
In contrast to desktop environments, mobile operating systems provide autofill frameworks
that attempt to provide a more unified and secure autofill experience. I continue my
dissertation by evaluating the security of these autofill mechanisms as well as password
manager security on mobile generally (see Chapter 4). This evaluations covers three mobile
autofill frameworks, each of which takes a different approach to how much of the autofill
process is handled by the framework: iOS’s app extensions (mostly handled by the password
manager), iOS’s Password AutoFill (mostly handled by the framework), and Android’s autofill
service (somewhere in the middle).
My results show that while autofill frameworks can be effective in ensuring correct
password manager behavior, existing frameworks are poorly implemented and can be more
detrimental than helpful when it comes to security. For mobile browsers, the frameworks fail
to properly check the security of the webpage where credentials are to be entered and do not
allow password managers to examine the webpage to make these checks themselves (like they
do on desktop). For WebView controls, I identify two novel phishing attacks that use the
password manager as a confused deputy to aid the attacker in using a malicious app to phish
credentials for arbitrary domains or to use a malicious webpage to phish credentials for a
legitimate app. Based on these results, I provide concrete recommendations for the design
and implementation of a more secure autofill framework.
After exploring the security of managers on both desktop and mobile devices, I turned
my attention to understanding how and why users use manager across their devices (see
Chapter 5). To this end, I conducted a semi-structured observational interview of third-party
password manager (e.g. LastPass, 1Password, Dashlane) users to understand how users
utilize managers on their own devices. I found that the persistent availability of browser
managers, along with concerns related to losing passwords and cross-device syncing issues,
lead users to adopt multiple managers, a phenomenon not reported in prior research. I also
found that concerns related to cross-device entry and the fear of non-availability prevented
users from using managers for the entire password lifecycle, which directly leads to password
reuse, helping explain previous findings [41, 72] that reuse is still common among manager
users.
3
At a high level, this dissertation begins by assessing how managers approach security and
then explores how users approach managers. By better understanding both managers and
their users, I lay the groundwork for future password managers to be both more usable and
more secure. In Chapter 6 I close with a discussion of key lessons learned while conducting




In this section, I describe the responsibilities of a password manager. I also describe prior
work that has analyzed password managers.
2.1 Password Managers
In the most basic sense, a password manager is a tool that stores a user’s credentials (i.e.,
username and password) to alleviate the cognitive burden associated with a user remembering
many unique login credentials [39]. This store of passwords is commonly referred to as a
password vault. The vault itself is ideally stored in encrypted form, with the encryption
key most commonly derived from a user-chosen password known as the master password.
Optionally, the password vault can be stored online, allowing it to be synchronized across
multiple devices.
In addition to storing user-selected passwords, most modern password managers can
help users generate passwords. Password generation takes as input the length of the desired
password, the desired character set, and any special attribute the password should exhibit
(e.g., at least one digit and one symbol, no hard to recognize characters). The password
generator outputs a randomly generated password that meets the input criterion.
Many password managers also help users authenticate to websites by automatically
selecting and filling in (i.e., autofill) the appropriate username and password. If users have
5
multiple accounts on the website, the password manager will allow users to select which
account they wish to use for autofill.
Taken together, password generation, storage, and autofill make up the password manager
life cycle [15]:
1. A user navigates to a website to create a new account. The password manager helps
the user generates a random password that is unique to the current website.
2. The password manager then stores the user’s username and generated password.
3. When the user next visits the website, the password manager autofills the user’s
username and generated password.
If properly implemented and used, a password manager has several tangible benefits to
the user:
1. It reduces the cognitive burden of remembering usernames and passwords.
2. It is easy to assign a different password to every website, addressing the problem of
password reuse.
3. It is easy to generate passwords that are resilient to online and offline guessing attacks.
For password managers that store user data on their servers, such as LastPass, the data
is always encrypted with the MP prior to being uploaded [41]. To preserve privacy, the MP
is not known to the company storing the data and encryption / decryption must occur on
the device. In browser-based password managers that allow syncing, such as Chrome, the
passwords are protected by the same credentials as the user account on the device.
2.2 Related Work
I discuss the related work in three sections, each relating to a chapter of this dissertation.
First, I discuss related work on desktop managers. Second, I discuss work relevant to autofill
on mobile devices. Third, I discuss usability and user studies of managers on both desktop




While prior work examines autofill and storage security, no prior work examines the security
of password generation in managers.
Desktop Autofill Security
Silver et al. [58] studied the autofill feature of ten password managers. They demonstrated
that if a password manager autofilled passwords without requiring user interaction, it was
possible to steal a user’s credentials for all websites that were vulnerable to a network
injection attack or had an XSS vulnerability on any page of the website. They also showed
that even if user interaction was required, if autofill was allowed inside an iframe, then the
attacker could leverage clickjacking to achieve user interaction without users realizing they
were approving the release of their credentials. Stock and Johns [60] also studied autofill
related vulnerabilities in six browser-based password managers and had similar findings to
Silver et al. Li et al. [39] studied five extension-based password managers and found logic
and authorization errors, misunderstandings about the web security model, and CSRF/XSS
attacks.
Storage Security
Gasti and Rasmussen [29] analyzed the security of the password vaults used by thirteen
password managers, finding a range of vulnerabilities that could leak sensitive information to
both passive and active attackers. These vulnerabilities were related to unencrypted metadata
as well as side channel information leakage from encrypted data. In addition, a recent study
by Independent Security Evaluators [21] found that password managers were not encrypting
passwords that they wrote to memory, making it trivial to extract some passwords from the
password vault even when it was not in use. Chatterjee et al. [13] and Bojinov et al. [9]
proposed alternative password vault schemes that are more resilient to offline attacks, but
password managers have not adopted these schemes.
7
2.2.2 Mobile Autofill
Work discussing phishing attacks and WebView vulnerabilities is relevant to my work on
mobile autofill because I identified a novel class of phishing attacks that utilize mobile
WebView. Attacks that utilize the accessibility service provided by the mobile OS or the
clipboard are also common in research on mobile security, so I include them here for reference.
Mobile Autofill Security
Aonzo et al. [3] demonstrated that malicious apps could trick the Android autofill service into
suggesting to the user that they autofill credentials for a legitimate app into the malicious
app. These attacks take advantage of poor mapping strategies between apps and online
domains used by password managers. They found that Keeper, LastPass, 1Password, and
Dashlane were vulnerable to mapping-based attacks, but did not identify any attacks against
Google Smart Lock. To address the problems they found, they recommend that all password
managers adopt Google Smart Lock’s mapping scheme which relies on Digital Asset Link
(DAL) files published to websites that identify which apps should receive credentials for that
website.
Like Aonzo et al., I too investigate app-to-domain mappings for Android password
managers, expanding Aonzo et al.’s work by examining additional password managers (13
password managers versus the five in Aonzo et al.’s work), finding that app-to-domain
mapping issues are widespread on Android. I also conduct the first analysis of app-to-domain
mappings on iOS, finding that iOS app extensions takes the most insecure approach to
app-to-domain mapping (apps choose what they are mapped to), but that the iOS Password
AutoFill framework enforces a secure app-to-domain credential mapping for all password
managers. As part of my investigation, I also identify two novel phishing attack that use the
WebView widget to sidestep app-to-domain mappings, even those of iOS Password AutoFill.
Feasibility of Phishing Attacks
Phishing attacks have been shown to be effective even against the most sophisticated users
when visual deception, such as website redressing or overlays, is used [19]. Felt and Wagner [24]
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also found that on mobile devices users are often asked by legitimate apps and websites to
autofill credentials after clicking a link. As a result, users become conditioned to providing
their credentials after clicking a link, which makes phishing attacks even easier. Luo et al. [40]
also demonstrated several effective phishing attacks against WebView on iOS that utilized UI
redressing and overlays to steal credentials. Most recently, Tuncay et al. [64] demonstrated
that naming policies for Android apps allowed malicious apps to effectively masquerade as
legitimate apps when requesting permissions from the user.
Several works have explored ways of protecting users from malicious apps that mimic
the GUI of legitimate apps in an attempt perform phishing or click-jacking attacks [8, 25].
Other prior work suggested content-based and heuristic approaches for protecting mobile
users from phishing websites [68, 57, 30]. To my knowledge, none of these solutions have
been implemented and phishing remains a problem.
This work is relevant to my dissertation as it shows that phishing attacks continue to work
on mobile devices. In particular, Tuncay et al.’s results showing that phishing attacks for
permissions were successful on Android suggest that the credential phishing attack described
in my dissertation is also likely to be successful.
Clipboard-Based Password Managers
In 2013, Fahl et al. [23] analyzed 21 password managers on Android and showed that they
encouraged users to copy passwords to their clipboard, which can be accessed by any app on
the device. Zhang et al. [73] showed that the clipboard could be used for both code injection
and phishing attacks. While most password managers no longer use the clipboard as their
primary means for autofill, several popular password managers are still clipboard-only and
even those that use other autofill approaches allow users to copy and paste their credentials
as a backup method if the primary autofill method fails. Additionally, while background
access to the clipboard is prohibited in the latest versions of both Android and iOS, home
screen widgets are still able to access this content when in the foreground, meaning that this
is still a valid attack vector [6].
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WebView
Yang et al. [70] showed that untrusted iframes inside a WebView can be used to break web
messaging integrity, stealthily access sensitive mobile functionalities, and perform phishing
attacks.
And Tuncay et al. [63] designed and tested Draco, a uniform access control framework
to protect apps from web code running in Android WebView. While embedded browsers in
Android apps (WebViews) can execute web code and provide JavaScript bridges that give
web code access to internal app code, they have no means of providing origin-based access
control to these JavaScript bridges. Draco solves this problem by providing developers with
the ability to implement strict policies about which app functionality can be accessed from
web code. Draco would not protect against either of the WebView based attacks I describe in
this dissertation because the attack that leverages communication between the app and the
WebView assumes a malicious app and the other attack does not require such communication.
Like Luo et al. [40], Yang et al. [70] did not leverage autofill in their attacks.
Attacks on the Accessibility Service
Fratantonio et al. [28] showed how accessibiilty permissions could be used to gain complete
control over the UI feedback loop, allowing the attacker to steal user credentials. They
suggest that this vulnerability is made worse by the fact that apps do not make users aware
of the permissions requested by an application on installation. Jang et al. [36] identified
twelve attacks against accessibility support services in both the iOS and Android sandboxes.
Other work has noted how accessibility services expose private information [38] and allow for
keylogging attacks [46]. Because most password managers on Android still request accessibility
service permissions for backwards compatibility and autofill in the browser, vulnerabilities
related to permissions in this service are relevant to my work.
2.2.3 Usability and User Studies
Prior password manager user studies focused largely on adoption [1, 5] or password strength
and reuse [41], and targeted either desktop [14, 72] or mobile devices [56, 1]. In addition,
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none of these studies involved observing users as they operated their password manager on
their own devices, instead relying solely on interview, survey, or post-study questionnaire
data. My work is the first based on a semi-structured observational interview of password
manager use across devices, allowing us to identify issues not found by prior work, such as
the frequent use of multiple managers and problems syncing across devices. Observation
also turned out to be important because several users initially misreported which password
manager they used and struggled to convey in words issues they experienced during use.
User Studies of Password Managers on the Desktop
Prior user studies of desktop based password managers focus on the impact of managers
on password strength and adoption. Lyastani et al. [41] found that password managers
do lead to the creation of stronger passwords overall, but that users still rarely maintain
strong, unique passwords for all of their accounts. And Pearman et al. [72] conducted a
semi-structured interview of 30 individuals, including users and non-users of managers, to
better understand adoption and usage, concluding that while users of browser-based managers
are more driven by convenience, users of separately installed managers are more driven by
security. This dissertation helps explain the findings of both Lyastani et al. [41] because I
found that generated passwords present usability hurdles to users, such as cross-device entry.
My work also helps explain the key finding of Pearman et al. [72] because I found that users
of browser-based managers often start using them without any forethought because they
persistently pop up, whereas users of third-party managers adopt them at work or based on
recommendations.
Pearman et al.’s findings nuanced those of Fagan et al. [22], who found that non-users
of managers avoid them due to security concerns, while users adopt managers for reasons
of convenience. More recently, Ray et al. [52] replicated Pearman et al.’s protocol with 26
adults over the age of 60, finding that older adults are more likely to adopt a manager if the
recommendation comes from a family member and have more concerns with storing passwords
in the cloud and syncing than younger adults. And in 2006, Chiasson et al. [14] found that
users’ incomplete mental models led to vulnerabilities in their studies of two desktop-based
maangers.
11
User Studies of Password Managers on Mobile Devices
Compared to password managers used on desktop/laptops, there is little work in the usability
space focused on mobile managers. Akaldi et al. [1] examined manager reviews in the app
store for both Google and Android devices, supplemented by a user survey, and found that
”no perceived usefulness” and lack of enjoyment, possibly due to finding them difficult to use,
deterred users from adopting them. These findings comport with those of Arias et al. [4].
More recently, Seiler-Hwang et al. [56] analyzed the usability of four smartphone password
managers, with 20 users evaluating each by first completing a series of 7 tasks meant to
represent the main functionality of a PM and then filling out post-task questionnaires. The 7
tasks were based on the work of Chiason et al. [14], and included initialization, migration,
login, app interaction, updating a password, and modifying security settings. As noted
by Seiler-Hwang et al. [56] when they discussed limitations, I believe that their task-based
approach may have altered user behavior, specifically as it relates to updating security setting.
They found that only 7.5% of users left default settings unaltered, whereas when I actually
observed users I found that an overwhelming majority of users do not modify default settings
at all, making it even more critical for settings to be secure by default. However, I recognize
that there may be other explanations for this difference other than methodology, such as the
fact that they focused exclusively on mobile managers.
2.2.4 Relation to This Work
To my knowledge, my work is the first to study the strength of password generators in
password managers and the first to simultaneously consider the full password manager
lifecycle [15] (i.e., generation, storage, and autofill). Much of the work examining the security
of password manager autofill and storage on the desktop is now over five or more years
old [58, 60, 39, 29]. As there have been significant updates to password managers in that
time, I have replicated this early work to determine whether the password managers I studied
have addressed the core issues revealed by this prior work, or whether they remain vulnerable.
My research also makes several unique contributions regarding mobile password managers.
I am the first to analyze the security of password managers on iOS. Second, I leverage the
12
same tests I ran on the desktop and apply them to mobile password managers, the first time
these types attacks have been tested on mobile platforms. Third, I present and evaluate novel
phishing attacks against WebView on both iOS and Android. Fourth, I replicate and expand
the work of Aonzo et al. [3] on Android, demonstrating that the lack of a good method
for mapping which credentials should be used with which applications remains a significant
problem. Compared to Aonzo et al.’s work, I study a wider range of password managers
(thirteen in my study versus five in theirs).
Finally, based on the results of my mobile and desktop analysis, I conduct the first
observational interview investigating third party password manager usage. In contrast to
my work, the interviews conducted by Pearman [50] only included seven users of third party
password managers and had no observational component. And the work of Lyastani [41]
focused specifically on the effect of password managers on password strength, rather than
usage in general. My findings help explain the problems with reuse identified by Lyastani [41]





In this section1, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of browser-based password managers,
including five browser extensions and six password managers integrated directly into the
browser. We also include two desktop clients for comparison. Five or more years have passed
since the previous studies that examined password managers in the browser [39, 58, 60],
leaving it unclear whether password managers remain vulnerable or whether they are now
ready for broad adoption. To answer this question, we update and expand on these previous
results and present a thorough, up-to-date security evaluation of thirteen popular password
managers.
In our evaluation, we consider the full password manager lifecycle [15]—password
generation (Section 4.6), storage (Section 4.7), and autofill (Section 3.4). For password
generation, we evaluate a corpus of 147 million passwords generated by the studied password
managers to determine whether they exhibit any non-randomness that an attacker could
leverage. Our results find several issues with the generated passwords, the most severe being
that a small percentage of shorter generated passwords are weak against online and offline
attacks (shorter than 10 characters and 18 characters, respectively). We also replicate earlier
work examining the security of password storage [29] and autofill [39, 58, 60].
1This chapter is adopted from my publication: Oesch, Sean, and Scott Ruoti. ”That Was Then, This
Is Now: A Security Evaluation of Password Generation, Storage, and Autofill in Browser-Based Password
Managers.” USENIX Security Symposium. 2020.
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Our results find that while password managers have improved in the past five years, there
are still significant security concerns. We conclude the section with several recommendations
on how to improve existing password managers as well as identifying future work that could
significantly increase the security and usability of password managers generally (Section 5.4).
Our contributions include:
1. Our research finds that app-based and extension-based password managers have
improved security compared to five years ago. However, there are still residual
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed—for example, several tools will automatically
fill passwords into compromised domains without user interaction and others that do
require user interaction allow users to disable it. As such, it is important to both
carefully select a password manager and to configure it properly, something that may
be difficult for many users.
2. To our knowledge, this work is the first evaluation of password generation in password
managers. As part of this evaluation, we generated 147 million passwords representing
a range of different password managers, character composition policies, and length. We
evaluated this corpus using various methods (Shannon entropy, χ2 test, zxcvbn, and a
recurrent neural net) to find abnormalities and patterns in the generated passwords.
We found several minor issues with generated passwords, as well as a more serious
problem where some generated passwords are vulnerable to online and offline attacks.
3. Our work is the most comprehensive evaluation of password manager security to date.
It studies the largest number of password managers (tied with Gasti and
Rasmussen[29]) and is the only study that simultaneously considers all three stages of
the password manager lifecycle [15]—password generation, storage, and autofill (prior
studies considered either storage or autofill, but not both simultaneously).
4. Prior security evaluations of password managers in the literature are now five or
more years old. In this time, there have been significant improvements to password
managers. In our work, we partially or fully replicate these past studies [29, 39, 58, 60]
and demonstrate that while many of the issues identified in these studies have been
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addressed, there are still problems such as unencrypted metadata, unsafe defaults, and
vulnerabilities to clickjacking attacks.
3.1 Analyzed Password Managers
In this work, we analyzed 13 different password managers. These password managers can
be categorized based on their level of integration with the browser: app, extension, and
browser. We focused on password managers in the browser but included two desktop clients
for comparison. Apps are desktop clients that are not integrated with the browser. Extension-
based password managers are deployed as a browser extension and do not rely on a desktop
application. Browser-based password managers are native components implemented as part of
the browser. We chose from among the most popular systems within each of these categories.
The breakdown of analyzed password managers into these categories is given in Table 3.1.
This table also reports on features related to utility and usability—support for password
generation and autofill, support for synchronizing extension settings and password vaults
using the cloud, ability to use the password manager from a command line interface—as
well as security—whether the tool supports multi-factor authentication (MFA), whether the
password vault can be locked, whether the master password for the vault must be entered on
its own tab or application (to prevent spoofing of this dialog [12]), whether the password
manager provides a tool to assess the security of stored accounts and passwords, whether the
manager clears passwords from the clipboard after they are copied, and whether the tool is
open source.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss each password manager analyzed and indicate
which version of the password manager we evaluated. In-depth details regarding password
generation, autofill, and storage are found in their respective sections.
3.1.1 App
The app-based password managers we analyzed eschew cloud syncing of vaults and settings
in favor of manual synchronization to increase security.
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KeePassX (v2.0.3). KeePass is an app-based password manager originally built using
the .NET platform and intended for use on Windows. KeePassX is a cross-platform port of
KeePass, replacing the .NET platform with the QT framework.
KeePassXC (v2.3.4). KeePassXC is a fork of KeePassX intended to provide more
frequent updates and additional features not found in KeePass or KeePassX (e.g., more
options for password generation, a command line interface). KeePassXC also provides a
browser extension that interfaces with the app to autofill passwords in the browser. In total,
the KeePass family of applications is estimated to have 20 million users [21].
3.1.2 Extension
Extensions lack permissions to clear the clipboard and so none of the extension-based password
managers support this feature, leaving user passwords vulnerable to any application with
clipboard access indefinitely. None of the extensions we analyzed supported synchronizing
settings for the extension itself, requiring that users remember to correctly update these
settings to match their security preferences for each new device they set up. These extension
settings include security critical options, such as whether to log out when the browser is
closed, whether to use autofill, and whether to warn before filling insecure forms. The user
experience for each of the extension-based password managers is mostly similar.
1Password X (v1.14.1). 1Password is estimated to have 15 million users [21]. 1Password
provides both an app-based client (1Password) and an extension-based client (1Password X);
in this work, we evaluated the extension-based client because it is the recommended tool if
integration with the browser is desired (something we assume most users would want).2 While
the security of both systems is similar, there are a few small differences—e.g., the password
is cleared from the clipboard in the app, but not the extension. Unique to 1Password, to
initially download the password vault from the cloud it is necessary to enter a 128-bit secret
key that was presented to the user when they generated their account, providing an extra
layer of security to the cloud-based password vault.
2https://support.1password.com/getting-started-1password-x/
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Bitwarden (v1.38.0). Bitwarden is unique within the extension-based password
managers that we analyzed in that all of its functionality is available to non-paid accounts,
whereas other password managers required a subscription to gain access to some features.
Dashlane (v6.1908.3). Dashlane is estimated to have 10 million users [21]. In addition
to storing the username and password for each website, Dashlane also tracks and synchronizes
the following three settings on a per-site basis: “always log me in”, “always require [the
master password]”, and “Use [password] for this subdomain only.” This feature provides a
slight advantage when compared to other extension-based password managers that do not
synchronize any extension settings.
LastPass (v4.24.0). LastPass is estimated to have 16.5 million users [21], the most of
any commercial password manager.
RoboForm (v8.5.6.6). RoboForm is estimated to have 6 million users.3 Like 1Password,
RoboForm offers both an app-based client and an extension-based client; in this work, we
evaluated the extension-based client for the same reason we took this approach with 1Password
X.
3.1.3 Browser
Compared to both app-based and extension-based password managers, browser-based
password managers lack many features. While all browser-based password managers allow
the cloud account storing the password vault to be protected using multi-factor
authentication, none except Firefox enable this vault to be locked short of removing the
account from the browser. Firefox provides the option to use a master password to restrict
access to the password vault. As these password managers do not have settings to sync and
never copy a password to the clipboard, those features are not applicable.
Chrome (v71.0). Chrome has some support for generating passwords. It detects when
a user might need a password and offers to generate a password for the user. Unlike any
other password manager, Chrome has basic functionality to try to detect the password policy.
Edge (v42.17134). Firefox (v64.0). Internet Explorer (v11.523). Opera
(v58.0.3135). These password managers are all similar in high-level functionality.
3https://www.roboform.com/business/features
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Safari (v12.0). Safari can generate passwords when integrated with iCloud Keychain,
though these passwords are always of the form “xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx”.
3.1.4 Updates for Password Managers
Since we conducted our research, there have been some minor changes in several of the
password managers: (1) KeePassXC has transitioned to using Argon2D as their default key
derivation function, (2) LastPass has updated their password generation interface, removing
the option to select the number of digits, and (3) RoboForm has updated their password
generation interface, removing the option to select the number of digits and increasing the
default password length to 16. We are also aware of a couple more significant changes on the
horizon: Firefox will transition to using Firefox Lockbox as its default password manager,
and Edge will transition to being built on top of the Chromium project.
3.2 Password Generation
Password generation is the first step in the password manager lifecycle. Of the 13 password
managers in our evaluation, seven have full support for password generation—KeePassX,
KeePassXC, 1Password X, Bitwarden, Dashlane, LastPass, and Roboform—and two have
partial support—Chrome and Safari. To provide a baseline by which to compare the password
managers, we wrote a python script that generates passwords using /dev/random and the
online Secure Password Generator4 (SPG), the first search result when searching for “password
generator” on Google.
3.2.1 Settings and Features
Table 3.2 provides a summary of configuration options, default settings, and features for
each of the tools tested. All password managers support ensuring that at least one character
from each selected character set is included in the generated password, though this can be
turned off in KeePassX, KeePassXC, and LastPass. All password managers other than the
4https://passwordsgenerator.net
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KeePassX kpx 3–64 G#  16 ld G# !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
KeePassXC kpxc 1–128 G#  16 ld # !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
1Password X oneps 8–50   20 all # !#%)*+,-.:=>?@]^_}~
Bitwarden bw 5–128   14 ld # !#$%&*@^
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LastPass lpass 4–100 G#  12 ld # !#$%&*@^
RoboForm robo 1–99   14 all # !#$%@^
Chrome chrm > 1  # 15 all !-.:_
Safari sfri 15  # 15 all -
SPG psgn 6–2048   16 all !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
/dev/random dvrn > 1 # # !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior # Insecure behavior
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browser-based password managers also have an option to avoid generating passwords that
contain characters that may be difficult for users to read and/or memorize (e.g., hard to
pronounce, looks similar to another character), though the exact characters removed are not
consistent between password managers.
While all password managers support the same set of letters and digits ([A-Za-z0-9]),
they each had different symbol sets. KeePassXC had the largest symbol set, supporting all
standard ASCII symbols (other than space) as well as supporting the extended ASCII symbol
set. KeePassX and Dashlane also support the standard ASCII symbols (other than space),
but not the extended ASCII symbol set. 1Password supports just over half of the ASCII
symbols (19 symbols), with the other systems supporting 8 or fewer symbols. As expected,
limiting the symbol set has a significant impact on the strength of generated passwords, the
implications of which are discussed later in this section.
One issue common in most password managers is that they save the last used settings as
the new default settings. While this might seem like a feature targeted at usability, it has
the potential to cause users to use less than optimal settings when generating passwords. In
general, there are two reasons for users to change their password generation settings: (1)
establishing safe default settings, (2) generating a password that conforms with a policy that
is weaker than the default settings. In the latter case, the newer, weaker settings will replace
the older, stronger settings as the new defaults. While users can manually restore their safer
settings, there is no guarantee that they will do so. Dashlane takes the optimal approach by
not automatically saving the latest settings but giving the user the option to override the
current defaults. KeePassX takes a middle-of-the-road approach, saving the new settings for
future passwords generated until the application is closed and opened again.
3.2.2 Password Collection and Analysis
To evaluate the quality of passwords generated by the password managers, we first collected
a large corpus of generated passwords from each password manager. We use a variety of
methods to generate passwords: existing command line interfaces (Bitwarden, our python
tool), modifying the source code to add a command line interface (Chrome, KeePassX,
KeeyPassXC), or using Selenium (1Password X, Dashlane, LastPass, RoboForm). We were
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unable to analyze passwords for Safari as it does not have any mechanism for scripting
password generation, though we did manually generate and analyze 100 passwords to check
for any obvious problems and did not detect any.
Generation was parameterized by character classes—letters (l), letters and digits (ld),
letters and symbols (ls), symbols and digits (sd), and all four classes together (all)—and
password length—8, 12, and 20 characters long—in order to determine if these options had
any effect on the randomness of generated passwords. Most tools defaulted to requiring
that generated passwords contain one character from each character set, with only Chrome,
KeePassX, KeePassXC, and our python tool not having this option enabled. For each
password manager, character class, and password length we generated 1 million passwords,
except 1Password X which does not allow passwords to be generated that only have symbols
and digits. This resulted in a corpus of 147 million passwords (10× 5× 3− 3).
After collecting this data set, we analyzed its quality in terms of randomness and
guessability. There is no known way to prove that a pseudorandom generator is
indistinguishable from random, so instead we leveraged a variety of analysis techniques, each
attempting to find evidence of non-random behavior: Shannon entropy, χ2 test for
randomness, the zxcbvn password analysis tool [67], and a recurrent neural net-based
password guesser [44].
Shannon entropy is used to check for abnormalities in the frequency of characters (not
passwords) produced by each generator. The Shannon entropy of a set is a measure of the
average minimum number of bits needed to encode a string of symbols based on the frequency
of their occurrence. It is calculated as −
∑
i pilogb(pi). While Shannon entropy is a bad
measure for user-chosen passwords [10], it is useful in evaluating the relative strength of
random passwords. Shannon entropy is not affected by the length of passwords, only by the
number of distinct characters that can be present in a string and their relative frequency
within the corpus.
The χ2 test for randomness is a simple statistical test for determining whether the
difference between two distributions can be explained by random chance. We used the χ2
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test to evaluate each of our passwords sets independently and corrected our p-values using a
Bonferonni correction5 to account for the multiple statistical tests from the same family.
The zxcbvn tool created by Daniel Wheeler [67] is used to detect dictionary words
and simple patterns that might be present in passwords, both potential examples of non-
randomness. zxcbvn also estimates the number of guesses a password cracker would take to
break a password, which we use to understand if passwords are resilient to online and offline
guessing.
In order to detect whether generated passwords had more subtle patterns than what
zxcvbn could detect, we used the neural network password analyzer built by Melicher et
al. [44]. This analyzer uses a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network
(RNN) architecture to build a password guesser based on a training set. As output, it
produces a Monte Carlo estimation of how long it would take the trained password guesser
to guess passwords in a test set. The configuration files we used for training and testing are
provided in Listing 3.1 below. For each password corpus, we used 80% of the passwords to
train the neural network and tested against 20% of the passwords. Due to problems with
the analyzer, we were only able to test passwords of length 8 and 12, as length 20 passwords
would crash with an out of memory exception regardless of what settings were used.
While zxbcvn and the recurrent neural net are both used to evaluate the quality of
randomness in the generated passwords, they also served to give approximations for how
many guesses it would take for an online or offline guessing attack to try that password.
Passwords that require more than 106 guesses are considered to be resilient against online
attacks and passwords that require more than 1014 guesses are considered to be resilient
against offline guessing [27]. Using this guess count, we were able to analyze whether the
password managers were generating passwords that were vulnerable to these attacks.
5To represent this correction, all p values are multiplied by 147, with a maximum value of 1.00. For this




























































Listing 3.1: Neural Network Configuration—Training (Left) and Testing (Right)
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3.2.3 Results
Password Strength: Our analysis of the generated passwords found that nearly all
passwords of length 12 and longer were sufficiently strong to withstand both online and
offline guessing attacks (see Figures 3.1c and 3.1d). Still, not all password managers created
passwords of equal strength, with these small perturbations having a significant effect on the
percentage of length 8 passwords that were secure against offline guessing attacks (nearly all
were secure against online guessing attacks) (see Figures 3.1a and 3.1b). These differences in
strength can largely be explained by the different composition of character set classes used
by each of the password managers. While the difference is most pronounced when
considering symbols (see Table 3.2), several password managers also limit the available
letters and digits (e.g., removing ‘0’ and ‘O’ due to similarity). Looking at character
frequencies (see Table 3.3), we also found that Dashlane uses a different set of letters
depending on the length of the passwords; it is unclear why Dashlane exhibits this behavior.
Randomness: Our χ2 testing found several instances of non-random behavior in the
generated passwords (see Table 3.4, detailed χ2 and p values are in Tables 3.5–3.7 below).
All but one of the non-random character frequency distributions can be explained by a single
feature—requiring that passwords have at least one character from each character set. When
this feature is not enabled, the probability that any given character will appear in a password
is proportional to the length of the password, and the number of characters from all the
enabled character sets (see Equation 3.1). When this feature is enabled, the probability is
also proportional to the number of characters in that character set (see Equation 3.2), causing
character frequencies to be higher for characters that come from smaller character sets (e.g.,











(a) Length 8, ld (b) Length 8, all
(c) Length 12, ld (d) Length 12, all
Figure 3.1: Neural Network Guess Estimates (log10). Differences are primarily attributed to
character set size.
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Table 3.3: Character Frequencies for length 20 passwords using all characters. Groups of
similar characters represent a requirement to include at least one character from that set,
causing characters from smaller sets to be selected with greater frequency.




























*Length 12 passwords. Dashlane uses different characters sets for long and short passwords.
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Table 3.5: Length 8 χ2 Scores for Character Frequency
all l ld ls sd
System p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2
KeePassX 1.00 84.62 1.00 42.15 1.00 65.49 1.00 77.38 1.00 38.81
KeePassXC 1.00 85.16 1.00 67.35 1.00 61.41 1.00 76.88 1.00 35.27
1Password X 0.00 294756 1.00 41.80 0.00 132469 0.00 17747
Bitwarden 0.00 724697 1.00 53.40 0.00 361209 0.00 362807 1.00 12.54
Dashlane 0.00 729301 0.00 1203 0.00 334844 0.00 47489 0.00 348990
LastPass 0.00 640316 1.00 72.20 0.00 96928 0.00 390413 0.00 156327
RoboForm 0.00 1108211 0.00 10792 0.00 470973 0.00 605343 0.00 41584
Chrome 1.00 54.95 1.00 38.50 1.00 47.51 1.00 40.28 1.00 16.16
SPG 0.00 445079 1.00 45.67 0.00 245539 0.0 10804 0.0 190506
/dev/rand 1.00 77.65 1.00 59.37 1.00 62.17 1.00 89.01 1.00 37.73
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Table 3.6: Length 12 χ2 Scores for Character Frequency
all l ld ls sd
System p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2
KeePassX .65 87.09 .74 44.12 .03 84.43 .45 83.96 .11 52.57
KeePassXC .052 116.17 .44 51.78 .56 58.64 .65 77.46 .54 39.42
1Password X 0.00 95480 .54 45.44 0.00 33175 0 1600
Bitwarden 0.00 481688 .49 48.60 0.00 239474 0.00 241181 .21 19.20
Dashlane 0.00 487295 0.00 765 0.00 224131 0.00 32113 0.00 233758
LastPass 0.00 428916 .73 44.30 0.00 64703 0.00 258080 0.00 104851
RoboForm 0.00 738458 0.00 7277 0.00 312865 0.00 403972 0.00 27661
Chrome .70 53.71 .51 46.11 .15 65.53 .99 31.27 0.00 34.3
Web generator 0.00 297694 .047 69.07 0.00 163675 0.00 7289 0.00 125531
/dev/rand .33 99.23 .27 56.73 .75 53.10 .31 89.93 .55 40.11
30
Table 3.7: Length 20 χ2 Scores for Character Frequency
all l ld ls sd
System p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2
KeePassX .62 88.10 .91 38.06 .14 73.07 .11 98.34 .30 45.11
KeePassXC .49 92.57 .79 42.76 .97 41.66 .71 75.38 .92 28.97
1Password X 0.00 12789 .82 38.21 0.00 2367 .03 90.32
Bitwarden 0.00 289893 .72 42.84 0.00 143389 0.00 143720 .21 19.10
Dashlane 0.00 956201 0.00 443060 0.00 401737 0.00 822537 .17 42.48
LastPass 0.00 256787 .50 50.32 0.00 38336 0.00 156177 0.00 63559
RoboForm 0.00 442762 0.00 4524 0.00 188292 0.00 241760 0.00 16928
Chrome .91 46.01 .36 49.88 .25 61.8 .50 51.2 .056 20.60
Web generator 0.00 178091 .69 45.53 0.00 98651 0.00 4617 0.00 75043
/dev/rand .63 88.73 .22 58.42 .29 66.77 .24 92.88 .49 41.62
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While the results for Bitwarden (sd) and Dashlane (l) may at first not appear to follow
this pattern, they in fact do. Bitwarden (sd) has equal numbers of symbols and digits (see
Table 3.3, causing them to be selected with equal frequency. In contrast, Dashlane (l) has a
non-random distribution because it uses a different number of upper and lowercase letters.
The only non-random result that cannot be explained at least partially by this feature
is RoboForm (l), which has an equal number of upper and lowercase characters. Looking
at all the character frequencies for RoboForm, we find that uppercase letters, other than
‘Z’, are selected more frequently than the lowercase letters. Additionally, the characters ‘Z’,
‘z’, ’9’ are consistently the least frequently selected characters. While it is not entirely clear
what causes this issue, we hypothesize that it might be related to selecting characters using
modular arithmetic (e.g., rand()%(max−min) +min), which can have a slight bias to lower
valued results.
Random but Weak Passwords: In our analysis of the zxcbvn results, we found that
occasionally all password managers would generate exceptionally weak passwords, examples
of which are shown in Table 3.8. While this is expected behavior for a truly random generator,
it still results in suboptimal passwords.
Even though randomly generated length 8-character passwords have the potential to be
resilient to offline attack (e.g., log10(96
8/2) = 15.56), password managers will present users
with passwords of this length that are vulnerable to both online and offline attacks. At length
12, the weakest passwords are no longer vulnerable to online attacks but are still vulnerable
to offline attacks. Finally, at length 20 the weakest passwords were able to withstand an
offline attack. While the occurrence of these weak passwords is relatively rare (less than 1 in
200), it is still preferable to choose passwords of sufficient length such that even randomly
weak passwords are likely to be resilient to online and offline attacks. Based on our analysis
of these results, that is length 10 for resilience to online attacks and length 18 for resilience
to offline attacks.
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Table 3.4: χ2 test for random character distribution
System l ld ls sd all
KeePassX 3 3 3 3 3
KeePassXC 3 3 3 3 3
1Password X 7 3 7 7
Bitwarden 7 3 7 7 3
Dashlane 7 7 7 7 7
LastPass 7 3 7 7 7
RoboForm 7 7 7 7 7
Chrome 3 3 3 3 3
SPG 7 3 7 7 7
/dev/rand 3 3 3 3 3
3 No statistically significant results (random)
7 Statistically significant result (non-random)


















KeePassX 8 l 4.96 TaKEdeen
KeePassXC 8 sd 4.84 '+'+'+_+
1Password X 12 ls 8.76 oMMMMMMT?m*m
Bitwarden 8 all 4.12 d@rKn3s5
Dashlane 8 sd 4.48 ////$8$8
LastPass 12 all 8.92 B@KeRee22241
RoboForm 8 ls 5.02 SAWyE@rS
RoboForm 8 sd 4.06 2345678#
Chrome 8 all 4.85 Tz5a5a5a
SPG 8 ls 5.32 nW$nW$RR
/dev/rand 12 l 9.0 MrKNxQNDAViS
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3.3 Password Storage
Password storage is the second stage of the password manager lifecycle. To evaluate the
security of password storage, we manually examined the local password databases created
by each password manager, looking to see what information was and was not encrypted, as
well as examining how changes in the master password effected the encryption of data. We
determined how encryption took place through a combination of claims from the password
manager’s maintainer, options available in the client, and format of the ciphertext. We focus
on the storage of the password vault on the local system as the cloud databases are not
available to us for direct evaluation. An overview of this information is provided in Table 3.9.
3.3.1 Password Vault Encryption
The app-based and extension-based password managers all encrypt their databases using AES-
256. These systems all use a key derivation function (KDF) to transform the master password
(MP) into a cryptographic key that can be used for encryption. KeePassX and KeePassXC
use AES-KDF with 100,000 rounds. All of the extension-based password managers, other
than Dashlane, use PBKDF2, with only RoboForm using less than 100,000 rounds. Dashlane
is the only password manager that uses a memory-hard KDF, Argon2D, with 3 rounds.
While not used by default, KeePassXC does support the option of using Argon2D in place of
PBKDF2.
Each of these password managers has different requirements for the composition of the
master password. KeePass and KeePassX both allow any composition for the master password,
including not using a master password at all. The extension-based password managers all
require a master password but vary in composition requirements. LastPass, RoboForm, and
Bitwarden require that the master password be at least eight characters but impose no other
restrictions. 1Password X increases the minimum length to 10, but otherwise is the same
as the other three. Only Dashlane has compositions requirements, requiring a minimum
length of 8 characters and one character from each character class (lowercase, uppercase,
digit, symbol).
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System Storage Storage Encryption Metadata Encrypted
KeePassX File (.kbdx) AES-256 AES-KDF 100,000 #          
KeePassXC File (.kbdx) AES-256 AES-KDF 100,000 #          
1Password X File (.json) AES-256 PBKDF2 100,000 G#        # #
Bitwarden File (.json) AES-256 PBKDF2 100,001 G#     #   #  
Dashlane File (.aes) AES-256 Argon2D 3 G#  #      #  
LastPass File (.sqlite) AES-256 PBKDF2 100,100 G#        #  
RoboForm File (.rfo) AES-256 PBKDF2 4,096 G#        #  
Chrome File (.sqlite)1 OS # # #  # #   
Edge Windows Vault         
Firefox File (.json) 3DES SHA-1 1 # #  #  # #   
IE Windows Vault         
Opera File (.sqlite)1 OS # # #  # #   
Safari OSX Keychain         
1On Linux, Chromium-based browser tries to store the password in the keyring
or KWallet 4. If neither of these are available, it will store the passwords in plaintext [16].
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior # Insecure behavior
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Of the browser-based password managers, only Firefox handles the encryption of its
password vault itself. It uses 3DES to encrypt the password data, using a single round of
SHA-1 to derive the encryption key. It imposes no policy on the master password. Compared
to other password managers that handle their own encryption, Firefox is by far the weakest.
The remaining browser-based systems rely on the operating system to help them encrypt
the password vault. Edge, Internet Explorer, and Safari all rely on the operating systems
keyring to store credentials. For Edge and Internet Explorer this is the Windows Vault; for
Safari it uses the macOS keychain.
Chrome and Opera also rely on the operating system to encrypt the password, but how
they do so varies by operating system. On Windows, the CryptProtectData function is used
to have Windows encrypt the password with a key tied to the current user account. On
Linux, these systems first try to write the password to the GNOME keyring or KWallet 4,
falling back to storing the passwords in plaintext if neither of these keychains is available.
On macOS, the passwords are encrypted with keys derived by the macOS keychain, though
the website passwords themselves are stored locally rather than on the keychain.
Browser-based password managers, other than Firefox, rely on the operating system to
encrypt passwords and therefore do not allow users to establish a master password. As such,
there is no way to lock the password vault separately from locking the account. While outside
the scope of this work, we also note that there is a need for more research examining the
security of OS-provided encryption functions and keychains.
3.3.2 Metadata Privacy
Compared to earlier findings by Gasti and Rasmussen [29], we find that app-based and
extension-based password managers are much improved in ensuring that metadata is properly
protected. KeePassX and KeePassXC both encrypt all metadata. Extension-based password
managers encrypt most metadata, but all have at least one item they do not.
1Password X stores extension settings in plaintext, allowing them to be read or modified
by an attacker. These settings include security-related settings such as whether auto-lock
is enabled, default password generation settings, and whether to show notifications. While
Dashlane encrypts the website URLs, it does not encrypt the website icons it associates
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with those URLs, allowing an attacker to infer websites for which a user has accounts. All
extension-based password managers leak the email address used to log in to the password
manager.
Browser-based managers that rely on an operating system provided keychain (Edge,
Internet Explorer, Safari, as well as Chrome and Opera on Linux) use these tools to protect
all relevant metadata. For the other browser-based password managers (Chrome and Opera
on Windows and macOS, as well as Firefox on all operating systems), there is a significant
amount of unencrypted metadata. All three of these password managers store the URL in
cleartext, and only Firefox encrypts the username. They also reveal information about when
the account was created, when it was last used, and how many times the password has been
filled.
3.4 Password Autofill
Of the password managers we evaluated, only KeePassX did not support autofill in the
browser6 and Bitwarden warns that its autofill functionality is experimental. To evaluate
these tools, we developed websites that leveraged the attacks identified by Li et al. [39],
Silver et al. [58], and Stock and Johns [60]. We also updated these attacks to address
protections that have been added by browsers and password managers since the attacks were
first described. Table 3.10 highlights several of our findings.
3.4.1 User Interaction Requirements
If an attacker can compromise a web page using either a network injection or XSS attack,
they can insert malicious JavaScript that will steal the user’s password when it is entered. If
a password manager autofills passwords without first prompting the user, then the user’s
password will be surreptitiously stolen simply by visiting the compromised website. As such,
user interaction should ideally be required before autofill occurs. Of the password managers
we tested, only 1Password X and Safari always require user interaction before filling in
6There is a browser extension adding autofill for KeePassX, but it is a third-party tool not a part of the
KeePassX project.
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System Interaction iframe Difference in fill form Fields Misc
KeePassXC G# G# G# G# # # #    # #   # #
1Password X    G#  G# G#  G# G# G# G#   # #
Bitwarden G# G# G# G#  # # # # # # #  # # #
Dashlane # #  G#  # #  # # # # #  # #
LastPass # #  G#  # # G#  # # G#   # #
RoboForm G# G# G# G#  # # # # # # #   # #
Chrome #  # # G# #   # # # #  # # #
Edge #   # G# # G#  # # # #  # # #
Firefox # # # # # # #    # #  # # #
IE #   # G# # G#  # # # #  # # #
Opera #  # # G# #   # # # #  # # #
Safari    G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G# G#   # #
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior # Insecure behavior
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credentials. The remaining password managers exhibited different behavior depending on the
protocol the website was served over (i.e., HTTPS or HTTP) as well as whether the HTTPS
certificate was valid.
For websites served over HTTPS with a valid certificate, KeePassXC, Bitwarden, and
RoboForm require user interaction by default, but also allow user interaction to be disabled.
Dashlane, Lastpass, and Firefox default to autofilling passwords without user interaction,
though there is an option to require user interaction. Chrome, Edge, Internet Explorer, and
Opera always autofill user credentials. While having an option to require user interaction
(Dashlane, LastPass, Firefox) is preferable to lacking that option (Chrome, Edge, Internet
Explorer, Opera), in practice the results are likely the same for most users (who are unlikely
to change their default options).
While network injection attacks are still possible on sites using HTTPS (i.e., TLS man-in-
the-middle attacks [49]), they are much easier to accomplish and more likely if the HTTPS
certificate is invalid. Reasons for a bad HTTPS certificate range from benign (e.g., expired
by a day) to malicious (e.g., invalid signature, revoked). In both cases, password managers
should altogether reject filling in the password or at the least require user interaction
before autofilling the password. In the case of an invalid certificate, KeePassXC, Bitwarden,
RoboForm, Dashlane, Lastpass, Firefox all function as they did with a valid certificate. Edge
and Internet Explorer both change their behavior and always require user interaction for bad
certificates. Chrome and Opera also change their behavior, entirely disabling the ability to
autofill passwords.
Network injection attacks are also more likely and easier to accomplish when the website
is served using an unsecured connection (i.e., HTTP). As with bad certificates, password
managers should refuse to autofill the password or require user interaction before filling it in.
KeePassXC, Bitwarden, and RoboForm continue to require user interaction by default, but
do allow users to disable this requirement. Dashlane, LastPass, Edge, and Internet Explorer
all change their behavior to always require user interaction before autofilling passwords on
HTTP websites.
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3.4.2 Autofill for iframes
Autofilling passwords within iframes is especially dangerous, regardless of whether user
interaction is required or not [58, 60]. For example, clickjacking can be used to trick users
into providing the necessary user interaction to autofill their passwords, allowing an attacker
to steal passwords for vulnerable websites loaded in an iframe (same-origin or cross-origin).
Even worse, if autofill is allowed for cross-domain iframes and user interaction is not required,
then the attacker can programmatically harvest the user’s credentials for all websites where
the attacker can perform a network injection or XSS attack (by loading compromised websites
into iframes).
For both the clickjacking and harvesting attacks, the user must first visit a malicious
website which will then launch the attacks, but this is often not a significant obstacle for an
adversary. In the worst case, if a system is vulnerable to a harvesting attack and the attacker
has access to the user’s WiFi access point (e.g., at hotel or airport)—allowing them to trivially
conduct network injection attacks—then all of a user’s credentials can surreptitiously be
stolen when the user views the network login page for the compromised access point [58, 60]
KeePassXC, 1Password X, Dashlane, and LastPass autofill within same-origin iframes,
leaving them vulnerable to clickjacking attacks. Bitwarden and RoboForm also autofill
within same-origin iframes, though if user interaction is required they are largely immune to
clickjacking as this interaction happens outside of the website inside the extension drop-down.
All of the browsers will autofill within a same-origin iframe.
KeePassXC does allow autofill for cross-domain iframes; while by default it does require
user interaction before autofill in cross-domain iframes, this requirement can be disabled
leaving KeePassXC vulnerable to the harvesting attack described above. Of the extension-
based password managers, 1Password X, LastPass, and RoboForm will not fill autofill within
a cross-origin iframe. Bitwarden and Dashlane do autofill cross-origin iframe, but autofill the
password for the domain of the top-most window (i.e., domain displayed in the URL bar),
preventing an attacker from stealing the cross-domain credentials.
Chrome, Edge, Internet Explorer, Opera, and Safari all require user interaction before they
will autofill passwords into a cross-domain iframe, though this still leaves them vulnerable
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to clickjacking attacks. Firefox defaults to not requiring user interaction before autofilling
passwords into cross-domain iframes, leaving it vulnerable to the domain harvesting attack
by default.
3.4.3 Fill Form Differing from Saved Form
Password managers detect when a user manually enters a password into a login form and
will then offer to save that password for later use. When the password manager later fills
this password, it can check that the form to be filled is similar to the form used when the
password was saved (e.g., same path or protocol). These types of checks help ensure that the
user is entering their password in a non-compromised form that has security equivalent to the
form they were using when they first saved their password. Still, there are many situations
where it makes sense for the form to have changed—for example, the password was saved on
a registration form. (i.e., not a login form).
As such, we gave password managers a full-dot if they either disallowed filling the form or
showed the user a notification when there was some disparity between the fill form and the
form used to save the password. A half-dot was given if the password manager required user
interaction when there was a disparity, but only if this user interaction couldn’t be disabled
(as it can be in Bitwarden and RoboForm). Note that 1Password X and Safari always require
user interaction and therefore always receive at least a half-dot. In the results discussed
below, we only highlight when password managers act differently due to discrepancies in the
login form.
Password managers do not react to discrepancies in the URL the form is served at
(other than checking that the domains match). If the password was saved on a form served
over HTTPS, Chrome and Opera will refuse to fill it in a form served with a bad HTTPS
certificate, with Edge and IE requiring user interaction. If the form is instead served over
HTTP, 1Password X and Dashlane will warn users and Chrome, Edge, Firefox, IE, and Opera
will refuse to fill the password. Also, LastPass will force user interaction.
If when the page is first loaded there is discrepancy in the form’s action property (the
URL the password will be submitted to), KeePassXC, LastPass, and Firefox will display a
warning, with Firefox also refusing to fill the password. If the action property is changed
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after page load (i.e., dynamically), KeePassXC and Firefox will display a warning, though
unlike before Firefox will go ahead and fill the password. Passwords managers do not react
to a similar discrepancy in the method property. If the input fields in the form have been
renamed or removed, LastPass will require user interaction.
3.4.4 Non-Standard Login Fields
We investigated whether password managers would fill form fields with type=‘‘text’’ (as
opposed to type=‘‘password’’), finding that only DashLane would autofill the password
in this case. We also examined whether the tools would autofill a minimal form (i.e., a
non-login form), containing only two input fields: a text field and a password field; autofilling
in this situation reduces the effort required for an attacker to harvest credentials. In this
case, we found that Bitwarden, Chrome, Edge, Firefox, IE, and Opera would all autofill these
non-login forms, with the remaining browsers only filling them when explicitly requested to
by the user.
3.4.5 Potential Mitigation
Stock et al. [60] recommended a more secure form of autofill that would address XSS-
vulnerabilities. Instead of filling the password onto the webpage, where it would be vulnerable
to XSS attacks, a nonce was filled into the website as the password. When the nonce was
about to be transmitted on the wire to the website, the password manager would then replace
the nonce with the real password. This approach prevents JavaScript on the webpage from
ever being able to access the user’s password. Additionally, the password manager can check
that the password is being sent only to the website associated with the password and that
the password form is not submitting to a different website.
We checked all the password managers to see if they supported this functionality and
found that none of them did. In our investigation of this feature, we tried to implement
it ourselves and found that browsers did not allow extensions to modify the request body,
preventing extension-based password managers from leveraging this more secure mode of
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operation.7 Enabling secure password entry is an area where browsers could do more to
improve authentication on the web and is discussed in greater depth in Section 5.4.
Silver et al. [58] and Stock and Johns [60] also explored whether setting the autocomplete
attribute to “off” on the password field would prevent password managers from storing or
autofilling the password. We found that no password manager obeys this attribute.
Looking at the current W3C specification, it is unclear whether the autocomplete
attribute should preclude storage and autofill of login credentials [65]. While the specification
does state that the “user agent” should not fill fields marked with autocomplete, it is unclear
if this is only referring to primary user agent (i.e., the browser) or also user agent extensions
(i.e., the password manager). Mozilla’s documentation also notes that in order to support
password manager functionality, most modern browsers have explicitly chosen to ignore the
autocomplete attribute for login fields. [45]. This helps explains why no password managers
currently obey this parameter, even though in prior research there was some support for this
attribute in browsers [58, 60].
3.4.6 Web Vault Security & Bookmarklets
In their analysis of extension-based password managers, Li et al. [39] showed that problems
with the security of online password vaults could magnify autofill issues. These web vaults
include both standalone interfaces to the password vault as well as acting as the
synchronization backend for extension-based password managers. For example, cross-site
request forgery (CSRF) could be used to change the URL associated with a set of credentials,
allowing all the user’s credentials to be autofilled and stolen from a single malicious domain.
Alternatively, XSS vulnerabilities on a web vault could be used to steal all its passwords.
We evaluated the five extension-based password managers and their web vault backends
to see if they had properly addressed potential CSRF and XSS attacks. We found that
1Password X, Bitwarden, DashLane, and LastPass use CSRF tokens to prevent CSRF attacks.
RoboForm does not appear to use CSRF tokens and we were able to launch a CSRF attack
against its web vault that changed the session timeout parameter. We were unable to find
7It may be possible to allow extensions to support this functionality in Internet Explorer using its
COM-based extensions, though the documentation is unclear in this regard.
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other CSRF attacks as the web vault appears to use cryptographic authentication and not
cookies to authenticate other requests.
To evaluate the susceptibility of the web vaults to XSS attacks, we manually inspected
each web vault’s content security policy (CSP) headers. The results of this evaluation found
no issues with either 1Password X or Dashlane’s CSP policies. Bitwarden’s policies had two
small issues: script-src allows “self” and object-src allows “self” and “blob:”. LastPass’s
policies allow for “unsafe-inline” in the script-src, leaving a significant opening for XSS
attacks. RoboForm did not have any CSP policy for their website. We did try to craft
XSS exploits for both LastPass and RoboForm, but these efforts were unsuccessful as both
sites employed extensive input sanitization; regardless, both web vaults would benefit from
implementing stricter (or any) CSP policies.
Finally, we examined whether extension-based password managers still have bookmarklet-
based deployment options (used to support mobile devices) that are vulnerable to attack [39].
We found that other than LastPass, the extension-based password managers no longer support
a bookmarklet-based deployment. In their place, password managers rely on native mobile
applications to handle password management on mobile devices. LastPass’s bookmarklets
correctly execute code inside a protected iframe and filter dangerous messages sent to the
bookmarklet, addressing the types of problems found by Li et al. [39].
3.5 Discussion
Our research demonstrates that app-based and extension-based password managers are
improved compared to how these types of tools performed in prior studies [29, 39, 58, 60].
In general, they have done a good job at addressing specific vulnerabilities: improving the
protection of metadata stored in password vaults, removed (insecure) bookmarklets, limited
the ability to autofill in iframes (preventing password harvesting attacks), and addressed
web security problems in the online password vaults. On the other hand, there has been
little change from earlier work in how they handle passwords for areas without specific
vulnerabilities: warning users about discrepancies between the fill form and form where
the password was saved or implementation of XSS mitigations. Similarly, browsers-based
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password managers continue to significantly lag behind app-based and extension-based
password managers, both in terms of security and functionality.
Based on our findings, we recommend that users avoid Firefox’s built-in password manager.
In particular, its autofill functionality is extremely insecure, and it is vulnerable to a password
harvesting attack [58, 60]. If an attacker can mount network injection attacks against a user
(e.g., control a WiFi access point), then it is trivial for that attacker to steal all credentials
stored in the user’s Firefox password vault. Hopefully, these issues will be addressed when
Firefox transitions to their Firefox Lockbox password manager. Users of KeePassXC’s browser
extension should also ensure that they do not disable the user interaction requirement before
autofill, as doing so will also make the client susceptible to the same password harvesting
attack.
We also suggest that users should eschew browser-based password managers in favor of
app- and extension-based password managers, as the latter are generally more feature rich,
store passwords more securely, and refuse to fill in passwords in a cross-origin iframe. The one
exception to this is Safari’s password manager, which does a good job of storing passwords
and avoids autofill mistakes, though it does lack a good password generator.
With the app- and extension-based password managers there is still a need for users
to ensure that they are properly configured. Neither Dashlane nor LastPass require user
interaction before autofilling passwords into websites, and Bitwarden and Roboform allow this
interaction to be disabled. If user interaction is disabled, a user that visits a compromised
website (e.g., an attacker has exploited an XSS vulnerability) can have their password for
that site stolen without the user being aware that this has happened. While this is not as
bad as a password harvesting attack [58, 60] (which is now prevented by extension-based
password managers), it is still a vulnerability that users should not need to know or worry
about. Of the extension-based password managers we studied, only 1Password X refuses to
ever autofill passwords.
In the remainder of this section, we describe our recommendations to improve functionality
within existing password managers. We also identify several areas for future research that
have the potential to significantly improve the utility and security of password managers.
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3.5.1 Filter weak passwords.
Our research shows that password managers will randomly generate passwords that can be
trivially cracked by online- or offline-guessing attacks. This is a natural extension of password
generation being truly random—i.e., any password can be generated, even if it is a natural
language word with common substitutions (e.g., “d@rKn3s5”) or exhibits repeated characters
patterns (e.g., “'+'+'+_+”). While this is extremely unlikely for passwords of sufficient length
(10 characters for online resistance, 18 for offline resistance), it is still possible. To address
this problem, we recommend that password generators add a simple filter that checks if the
generated password is easily guessable (easily checked using zxcvbn), and if so, generate a
replacement password.
3.5.2 Better master password policies.
Password managers require that users select and manage a master password, with the hope
because they only need one password that users will select a sufficiently strong secret. If
users fail to pick a good master password, especially if the selected master password is not
online-attack resilient, then a password manager becomes a single point of failure for that
user’s accounts. Unfortunately, trusting users to always choose strong master passwords
is problematic for three reasons: (1) users don’t necessarily understand what constitutes a
strong password, (2) their chosen passwords might have transformations they consider unique
but turn out to be common, and (3) users might still select an easy password because it is
more convenient.
For these reasons, we recommend that password managers adopt stringent requirements
for master password selection, preventing users from turning their password manager into a
single point of failure. Additionally, password managers should all transition to using memory
hard KDFs for transforming the master password into an encryption key.
3.5.3 Safer autofill.
Autofilling credentials without user interaction puts those credentials at risk if the website is
compromised by an XSS attack. For this reason, we recommend that password managers
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default to require user interaction before autofilling passwords. Where possible, we also
suggest removing the option to disable user interaction as users are unlikely to understand the
implications of turning it off. Autofilling into iframes, same- or cross-origin, is also dangerous
as it allows clickjacking attacks to circumvent user interaction requirements. As such, we
recommend disabling autofill with iframes, or if that is not feasible to consider moving the
user interaction out of the web page and into the browser—as Bitwarden and RoboForm
do—making clickjacking attacks much more difficult.
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Chapter 4
A Security Analysis of Autofill
Frameworks on iOS and Android
On desktop environments, password managers are primarily implemented as ad-hoc browser
extensions—i.e., the extension individually implements all aspects of the autofill process
without support from OS or browser autofill frameworks. While some desktop password
managers correctly achieve P1 and P2 [48], many have incorrect implementations that allow
attackers to steal or phish users’ credentials [39, 58, 60, 48], and none are able to fully
implement P3 due to technical limitations of browser extension APIs [60, 48].
In contrast to the situation on desktop, mobile operating systems provide system-wide
autofill frameworks that attempts to standardize and secure the autofill process. Critically,
these frameworks have the potential to enforce correct handling of P1–P3 for all mobile
password managers. Additionally, these frameworks provide support for autofill within apps,
which is largely unavailable on desktop.
In this paper, we conduct the first evaluation of the mobile autofill frameworks, examining
whether they achieve substantive benefits over the ad-hoc desktop environment or become
a problematic single point of failure. In this evaluation, we consider all such frameworks:
iOS’s app extensions, iOS’s Password AutoFill, and Android’s autofill service. Positively,
our evaluation finds that all frameworks correctly require user interaction before autofilling
credentials (P1), a marked improvement over the mixed support on desktop. In contrast, we
find that framework support for P2 and P3 is severely limited.
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Within browsers, we find that the framework does not check that the webpage to be filled
was sent over a secure channel, nor that filled credentials will be sent to the appropriate domain
upon form submission. The framework also fails to provide sufficient information about
the webpage to the password managers, preventing the managers from making appropriate
security checks themselves. Overall, this leads to mobile password managers being less secure
then their desktop counterparts.
Within apps, autofill behavior differs based on the type of interface being filled: (1)
native UI elements, (2) WebView controls, and (3) custom-drawn UI elements, of which the
first two are supported by mobile autofill frameworks. For native elements, we find that
iOS Password AutoFill provides a strong and secure binding between credentials and apps,
achieving P2 and P3. In contrast, the Android autofill service provides no such binding,
leaving the mapping of credentials and apps to the individual password managers, with nearly
all such mappings being insecure (breaking P2). Even worse, iOS app extensions not only
fail to provide a secure mapping mechanism but also prevent managers from implementing
their own mappings, allowing any credential to be autofilled into any app.
For WebView controls, credentials should only be autofilled if they match the domain of
the webpage within the WebView control, regardless of which credentials are mapped to the
app. Such behavior is enforced by iOS Password Autofill (achieving P2), whereas both iOS
app extensions and the Android autofill service leave the mapping decision to the individual
password managers, with only some managers implementing the mapping correctly. Managers
that do not properly implement this mapping instead autofill the app’s mapped credentials
into the webpage, allowing malicious or compromised webpages displayed in benign apps to
phish the app’s mapped credential (breaking P3). Even in the frameworks and managers that
do enforce a secure mapping, we identify a limitation in the design of WebView controls on
Android and iOS that allows a malicious app to host benign webpages within a (potentially
invisible) WebView and steal filled credentials, enabling the surreptitious phishing of all the
user’s credentials (also breaking P3).
Critically, in both phishing attacks, the password manager acts as a confused deputy,
displaying the autofill dialog and suggesting that the user fills the credential being targeted
by the attack. This is extremely problematic, as in all other contexts the autofill dialog is an
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indication that phishing is not occurring, and is designed to give users confidence in filling
their credentials. As such, users are unlikely to look carefully at the autofill dialog, increasing
the probability that their credentials will be successfully stolen.
Overall, our results show that there are significant issues with mobile autofill frameworks.
This does not mean that they are the wrong way forward, but rather that they need to be
sufficiently improved so that they can live up to their full potential. We conclude this paper
by providing recommendations for how to improve autofill frameworks, and also detail how
the design of WebView controls could be improved to address the phishing attacks identified
in this paper.
4.1 Background
In this section, we first provide general background on password managers. We then provide
specific details regarding secure autofill. We finish by providing information about WebView
controls.
4.1.1 Password Managers
Password managers serve to help users (a) create random, unique credentials for each service
they authenticate to, (b) store the user’s credentials (both generated and user entered), and
(c) fill those credentials for the user. These features provide several tangible benefits for users:
1. They reduce the cognitive burden of remembering usernames and passwords. While
users must generally still remember a strong master password, the assumption is that
this is easier to do than memorizing the tens or hundreds of passwords they would
otherwise need to.
2. Due to this reduced cognitive burden, they make it possible for users to have unique
passwords for every service they authenticate to, addressing the problem of password
reuse.
3. They help users generate passwords, avoiding weak passwords that would be vulnerable
to online and offline guessing attacks.
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4. They audit user credentials, helping users identify and replace reused or weak passwords,
as well as notifying users of password breaches that involve the user’s credentials.
4.1.2 Secure Autofill
Autofilling credentials is a multi-step process. First, the password manager must detect the
login form to be filled. Second, it must identify the correct credentials to fill into the login
form. Third, the manager must ensure that filling the credentials is safe. Finally, the manager
will actually fill the appropriate credentials.
By examining past research [39, 58, 60, 3, 48], we have systematized three properties that
need to be guaranteed by password managers in the third step above if autofill is to be secure:
• P1—User authorization. Requiring user authorization before filling credentials helps
reduce the attack surface by limiting how often credentials are filled and thus vulnerable
to theft [39, 58, 48]. Without interaction, credentials would be automatically filled into
any and all login forms, leaving them vulnerable to theft if an attacker can control
the page’s contents (for example, XSS vulnerabilities remain common [62], supply
chain attacks are increasingly regular [71], and network attacks are feasible when users
connect to public WiFi access points [47]). While P3—if properly enforced—protects
against such attacks, leveraging P1 as well provides defense-in-depth. This defense-in-
depth is especially important as both the current paper and past work [39, 58, 60, 48]
demonstrate that P3 is poorly supported in most contexts.
Note, it should not be assumed that users will carefully examine these dialogs, as they
likely will become habituated to clicking through them [19, 24]. Instead, requiring
interaction is primarily intended to prevent the surreptitious entry and subsequent theft
of credentials—for example, Firefox’s built-in password manager fails to require user
interaction and due to other flaws in its implementation allows an adversary to silently
steal all of the user’s credentials [48]; such an attack would be difficult if not impossible
to conduct if user interaction was required as the attack would trigger thousands of
autofill requests, alerting the user that something was wrong [48]. Similarly, requiring
interaction can also help prevent attacks when the user is not trying to authenticate,
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in which case they are more likely to click out of the autofill interface to resume their
usage of the the webpage or app, thus preventing potential credential theft.
• P2—Secure credential to destination mapping. Managers need to be able to
map credentials to the webpage and apps they should be filled in, preventing other
webpages and apps from accessing those credentials [3]. Such a mapping prevents
malicious webpages and apps from stealing credentials intended for other webpages
and apps—i.e., phishing attacks. Most commonly, this mapping is done by associating
credentials with domains, then associating those domains with apps. When properly
implemented, the autofill interface then becomes a sign to users that they are not being
phished and can safely enter the suggested credentials on the current site or app.
• P3—Credentials are only accessible to mapped destinations. Managers should
ensure that after credentials are filled, that they will only be accessible to mapped
destinations [60, 48]. For webpages, that means that the credentials will only be sent to
a server on the same domain and that they will not be accessible to malicious JavaScript
running on the page that may try to exfiltrate the credentials to different domains [60].
For apps, this means that credentials should not be available to other apps on the
system. Finally, it also means that if the app is hosting a webpage in a WebView
control, that the webpage cannot access credentials intended for the app, nor vice-versa.
4.1.3 WebView
WebView controls are UI widgets provided by the mobile operating system that serve as
embeddable, minimalist browsers. They are used by apps to display web content directly
within the app, as opposed to having users click a link that opens the main mobile browser.
On Android, WebViews are added using the WebView1 class, whereas on iOS they are added





To allow for integration between a hosting app and the content in the WebView, both
iOS and Android allow the WebView control to be styled by the hosting app. This styling
is arbitrary and can even go so far as to make it impossible to distinguish between native
widgets and content displayed in the WebView. As such, it is possible for the app to prevent
the user from knowing they are interacting with content from a domain the app should not
have access, making phising attacks trivial [40].
Additionally, the hosting app is able to inject JavaScript into the content hosted in the
WebView. While this is intended to enable bidirectional communication between the app and
the WebView content, in practice it allows the app arbitrary control of the WebView content.
For security reasons, the Android developer documentation recomends that WebView only be
used to show trusted, first-party content. However, prior work by Yang et al. [70] found that
many popular apps—such as Google News, Facebook, and Uber—load third-party, untrusted
content in a WebView and that 11K of the 17K most popular free apps on Google Play
contained entry points to WebView loading APIs.
4.2 Evaluation Methodology
There are three mobile autofill frameworks available on iOS and Android (the dominant
mobile platforms). On iOS, there is the app extensions framework and the Password AutoFill
framework. On Android, there is the autofill service. Prior to the availability of the Android
autofill service, many password managers used the Android accessibility (a11y) service to
hack in support for autofill. We chose not to include the a11y service in our evaluation for
two reasons: first, it is not and designed as an autofill framework and thus doesn’t serve as
a meaningful point of comparison and second, it is now well-known that the accessibility
service is ill-suited to be used for security purposes [36, 38, 28, 46].
As part of our evaluation, we identified three contexts in which autofill occurs on mobile
devices:
1. Webpages displayed in mobile browsers.
2. Native UI elements (i.e., widgets provided by the OS) presented within mobile apps.
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3. Webpages displayed in WebView controlls presented within mobile apps.
In our evaluation, we consider all three of these contexts. While the requirements to satisfy
P1 is the same for each of these contexts, they divergent for P2 and P3. As such, we used
different tests in each context to explore the security of autofill. These context-dependent
tests along with with their results are given in §4.3, §4.4, and §4.5, respectively.
In the remainder of this section we give more details about the three mobile autofill
frameworks we tested. We then give details about our overall testing approach.
4.2.1 Mobile Autofill Frameworks
Below we provide background on the three mobile frameworks tested in our work. For those
interested, Appendix A provides a historical overview of credential filling on iOS and Android.
iOS App Extensions
App extensions were introduced in iOS 8 (2014) and allow a host app to interact with another
app (e.g., a password manager) using a predefined set of extension features. For password
autofill, this requires the password manager to implement the set of functions associated with
the password management extension feature and for host apps to be updated to query this
extension feature. Note, the functionality provided by app extensions is minimal, enabling
autofill, but not attempting to secure it. For example, host apps are trusted to identify which
credentials they should receive, with the framework doing nothing to check this mapping or
verifying that the host app is not sending those credentials to a different domain. Figure 4.1
shows the interface for app extensions, first requiring the user to select which app extension
to use (see Figure 4.1a) and then selecting the credentials (see Figure 4.1b).
While superseded by iOS Password AutoFill, we included iOS app extensions in our
evaluation for three reasons: (1) it is still supported in iOS and remains functional in some
password managers (e.g., 1Password, Keeper, LastPass) and host apps (e.g., Safari, Edge);
(2) for older devices that cannot be updated to iOS 12, app extensions remain the preferred
method for password autofill; (3) it provides a distinct approach to designing frameworks
which provides a helpful point of comparison to the other two frameworks.
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(a) Selecting app extension (b) Selecting password
Figure 4.1: iOS App Extensions UI
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iOS Password AutoFill
The Password AutoFill framework was introduced in iOS 12 (2018) and takes a radically
different approach to autofill. Whereas app extensions provided minimal functionality,
Password AutoFill controls the entire autofill process in an attempt to improve the usability
and security of password autofill. First, it handles the identification of login forms in both
apps and websites, though the host app can help this process by annotating appropriate fields
using the textContentType attribute. Second, Password AutoFill ensures a secure mapping
between an app and the domains that should have their credentials entered into that app.
That is done by having app developers include an Associated Domains Entitlement that
indicates which domains are associated with the app; the domain operator is also required
to include an apple-app-site-association file on their website indicating which apps are
allowed to use credentials for that domain. Third, Password AutoFill handles both the UI
shown to users and the actual entering of credentials into the target app. Figure 4.2 shows
the interface for Password AutoFill, both when an associated domain can be found (see
Figure 4.2a) and when not (see Figure 4.2b).
Android Autofill Service
In 2017, Android introduced the autofill service as part of API 26 (Android 8.0—Oreo). This
service falls between iOS’s app extensions and Password AutoFill in terms of the features it
supports. Like Password AutoFill, it handles the identification and filling of login forms for
apps and websites, with apps being able to help this process by annotating interfaces using
the android:autofillHints attribute. Unlike Password AutoFill, it does not control the
credential selection UI (Figure 4.3 gives two examples of UIs provided by password managers
on Android), nor does it enforce any app-to-domain credential mapping.
4.2.2 Testing Approach
Our evaluation of the three mobile autofill frameworks was primarily empirical in nature.
More specifically, we selected and evaluated 14 mobile password managers, each of which was
implemented using one or more of the frameworks under test. These managers were chosen
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(a) Credential found (b) No credential found
Figure 4.2: iOS Password AutoFill UI
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as they are the most popular password managers implement with the frameworks under test.
Table 4.1 summarizes these password managers, which frameworks they support, and which
versions were tested. Download counts for each tool are given in Appendix B.
For each of these managers, we conducted a series of test designed to evaluate how well
the manager enforced P1–P3 (see §4.1.2). Within these evaluations, we payed attention to
when the results were either the same and when they were different, helping us measure
to what extent P1–P3 were enforced by the framework, to what extent the frameworks left
implementing these properties to the individual managers, and to what extent the frameworks
limited the ability of the individual managers to achieve these properties. In addition to
this empirical evaluation, we also reviewed the documentation and APIs for each framework
to try an contextualize and confirm our results. We also reached out to developers of the
password managers to understand the results, though only a few responded to our requests
for information.
Testing in iOS was performed using an iPhone 7 running iOS 13. Testing on Android
was conducted using the Genymotion Android Emulator to simulate a Google Pixel 2 device
running Android 9 (Pie).
4.3 Browser Autofill
We begin our investigation by exploring autofill within mobile browsers. As the security
concerns for autofill on mobile browsers are the same as those on desktops, we base our
methodology on the recent evaluation of desktop password managers conducted by Oesch
and Ruoti [48]. We choose to use this methodology for two reasons—first, it is complete,
covering all necessary aspects of browser autofill security and second, it allows us to directly
compare the performance of mobile password managers to desktop managers. For each of the
tests described by Oesch and Ruoti, we identify which of the three properties we synthesized
(P1–P3) that the test relates to, removing extraneous tests that identify interesting edge
cases but which cover features not actually needed to implement autofill securely.3 We also
3We contacted Oesch and Ruoti regarding our removal of tests and they agreed that they were appropriate.
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1Password 3 3 3 7.4.7 7.4
Avast Passwords 3 3 3 1.15.4 1.6.4
Bitwarden 3 3 3 2.3.1 2.2.8
Dashlane 3 3 6.2013.0 6.2006.3
Enpass 3 3 3 6.4.2 6.4.0
iCloud Keychain 3 13.3.1 —
Keepass2Android 3 — 1.07b-r0
Keeper 3 3 3 14.9.1 14.5.20
LastPass 3 3 3 4.8.0 4.11.4
Norton 3 3 3 6.8.78 6.5.2
RoboForm 3 3 3 8.9.2 8.10.4
SafeInCloud 3 3 20.0.1 20.2.1
Smart Lock 3 — 9.0
StrongBox 3 1.47.4 —
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considered if there were any additional tests needed to satisfy the three properties, but found
that the trimmed set of tests was sufficient to fully evaluate P1–P3.
All tests were performed using the default browser for each operating system: Safari
(v13.3.1) for iOS and Chrome (v 81.0.4044) for Android. We chose to focus on the default
browser as they are likely the most widely used browser on each respective platform.
Additionally, the browsers are developed by the same company developing the autofill
framework, allowing us to measure the security of the frameworks at their best.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the paired down tests along with our results.
These results for each framework are summarized in Table 4.2. To allow for an easy comparison
with desktop managers, Table 4.2 also provides the ratings for the most and least secure
desktop managers from the prior work [48]. The full results for individual managers can be
seen in Appendix C.
4.3.1 P1—User Interaction
We tested whether this property was supported by constructing a login webpage and visiting
it in the mobile browser, recording whether user interaction was required before credentials
were filled. We visited this webpage over HTTP, HTTPS, and using HTTPS with an invalid
certificate to test whether this impacted user interaction requirements (as it does on some
desktop browsers).
Our results show that all three frameworks correctly require user interaction before filling
credentials. This is a marked improvement over desktop managers, where only 2 of the
12 managers tested by Oesch and Ruoti enforced user interaction. This result shows the
potential for autofill frameworks to enforce correct behavior across all password managers.
Finding #1: Within browsers, P1 is enforced by all frameworks, a marked
improvement over the situation on desktops.
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Framework P1 P2 P3
iOS Password AutoFill   # # # # # # #
iOS App Extensions   # # # # # #  
Android Autofill Service   # # # # # # .
Most secure desktop manager [48]   G#  # G# G# G#  
Least secure desktop manager [48] #   # #   # #
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior
# Insecure behavior . Delegated to password manager
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4.3.2 P2—Credential-to-Domain Mapping
To test credential mapping, we first registered credentials for different domains. We then
created testing webpages across multiple domains and checked that each domain only received
credentials that were appropriate for that domain.
We also tested if the credential mapping took into account whether the source of the
webpage was authenticated using HTTPS. To do this, we created test pages that were served
over HTTP and over HTTPS with an invalid certificate, respectively, observing whether
autofill would proceed or not. Ideally, autofill would not be allowed in these cases, as such
occurences could represent a network attack being used to steal credentials.4 We also allow
for a rating of partially secure when autofill is allowed, but only after notifying the user of
the potential danger.
We find that while all password managers do map credentials to their appropriate domains,
none of them check whether the webpage was served over a secure HTTPS connection, thus
leaving open the possibility of network injection attacks. Worse yet, the frameworks provide
insufficient information to the password managers, preventing them from checking and
enforcing this property themselves. This leads to mobile managers being as bad as or worse
than even the least secure desktop managers in regards to P2.
Finding #2: Within browsers, P2 is only partially enforced by the frameworks. The
frameworks also prevent the managers from being able to enforce this property, causing
mobile managers to be less secure than all desktop managers.
4.3.3 P3—Protecting Filled Credentials
The best way to achieve P3 is to only fill credentials into the web request itself, a proposal
first described by Stock and Johns [60]. As the credentials are set inside the web request, they
are never stored on the webpage and thus cannot be accessed by JavaScript (malicious or
benign) executing on the webpage. On desktops, implementing this proposal is not possible
as browser extensions lack the permissions to modify the web request; in contrast, this is not
4The user can always override this behavior by manually copying and pasting credentials.
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a significant limitation on mobile, where both the framework and browser are maintained by
the same entity, allowing them to implement advanced protections such as these. We test
whether this proposal is used by creating a page with JavaScript that attempts to exfiltrate
filled passwords.
When the above approach is not used, it is not feasible to prevent malicious JavaScript
from accessing the field credentials. Still, it is possible to limit the likelihood that credentials
will be accidentally sent to an unmapped domain. First, the login form’s action attribute
should be checked to ensure that credentials will be submitted to the appropriate domain. We
test this by creating two webpages, one that has the form’s action set to a different domain
at page load (our static test), and one that sets the action field after page load, but before
the credentials are autofilled (out dynamic test). Second, the login form’s method attribute
should be checked to ensure that the credentials are not included in the URL (i.g., using a
GET request), as this could potentially leak the credentials to another domain through the
HTTP Referer header. We test this by creating a webpage with the method set to GET and
observing whether autofill is allowed. For both of these checks, we consider secure behavior
refusing to fill the credential, with partially secure being awarded if the credential is filled
only after warning the user about potential dangers.
Finally, autofill within cross-domain iframes should be disabled [58, 60, 48]. If a user
visits a malicious or compromised webpage, the adversary can open a cross-origin iframe to
any domain where they can inject JavaScript and steal credentials when those credentials
are autofilled. In the worst case, if user interaction is not required, the credential theft will
always succeed and will be unnoticed by the user. Even if user interaction is required, the
adversary is still able to effectively launch a phishing attack, which is likely to succeed as the
apperance of an autofill dialog is supposed to indicate to the user that a phishing attack is
not occurring (see §4.1.2). We test this by creating a webpage with a cross-origin iframe and
observe whether the iframe triggers autofill.
Our results show that none of the password managers adopt Stock and Johns’ proposal,
leaving filled credentials at risk of theft by JavaScript-based attacks. Additionally, none of
them check the action or method fields on the login form. As with P2, they also fail to
provide sufficient information to the managers to allow the managers to implement these
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features themselves. In regard to cross-origin iFrames, iOS Password AutoFill does not
prevent cross-origin autofill, and does not allow any of the managers to overide this behavior.
In contrast, the older iOS app extensions properly prevent cross-origin autofill. On Android,
the autofill service does not prevent cross-origin autofill, but does allow managers to override
this behavior. As with P2, the mobile frameworks perform as bad as or worse than even the
least secure desktop manager in regards to P3.
Finding #3: Within browsers, P3 is not enforced, leaving filled credentials vulnerable
to both theft and accidental leakage. The frameworks also prevent the managers from
being able to enforce this property, causing mobile managers to be less secure than
nearly all desktop managers.
4.4 App Autofill
We continue our evaluation by examining autofill within apps. One of the greatest benefits of
the mobile autofill frameworks is that they support autofill within apps, something that is
largely unavailable in the desktop environment. There are three different ways login interfaces
can be displayed within apps: (1) using native UI elements (i.e., OS-provided widgets),
(2) using custom UI elements drawn and managed by the app, and (3) within a webpage
displayed in a WebView hosted by the app. The first of these approaches is discussed in
this section, while the third is discussed in the next section. The second approach cannot be
detected or autofilled by mobile frameworks, and so it is excluded from our analysis.
An overview of the results of our analysis is given in Table 4.3.
4.4.1 P1—User Interaction
We tested whether this property was supported by constructing a custom app and attempting
to autofill it, recording whether user interaction was required before credentials were filled.





Figure 4.3: Android Password AutoFill UI







































































Framework P1 P2 P3
iOS Password AutoFill      
iOS App Extensions  # #   
Android Autofill Service  . .   
 Secure behavior # Insecure behavior
. Delegated to password manager
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Cross-origin iframe overlay 
of any walmart.com page
with XSS vulnerability
evilwalmart.com
Figure 4.4: Example of a cross-origin iframe phishing attack
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Finding #4: Within native UI elements, P1 is enforced by all frameworks.
4.4.2 P2—Credential-to-App Mapping
There are two ways that credentials could be mapped to apps. First, there could be a direct
mapping between credentials and apps. Second, there could a mapping between Web domains
and apps, leveraging the existing credential-to-domain mapping to providing an indirect
credential-to-app mapping. It is this second approach that is used by all mobile frameworks
and managers. This likely arises due to the fact that browser-based autofill significantly
predates app-based autofill.
When establishing a domain-to-app mapping, it is ideal if this mapping is bi-directional.
First, the app should identify which domains it is associated with, limiting the number of
credentials it could access if the app became compromised (an application of the principle of
least privilege). Second, a domain should list which apps are allowed access to its associated
credentials, preventing a malicious app from being able to access arbitrary domains’ credentials.
Only when both of these mappings agree should a credential for the given domain be suggested
by the autofill framework. Both of these mappings should be secured cryptographically—for
example, by (1) code signing the app (including the file identifying the mapped domains), (2)
using the fingerprint of the code signing certificate in the identification of apps on the domain’s
side, and (3) transmitting the domain’s mappings using TLS. Note, this bi-directional mapping
does impede the use of single sign-on (SSO)—for example, Google’s domain is unlikely to
whitelist all the apps that use it for SSO—but this use case can be handled by hosting the
SSO interface in a WebView (see §4.5).
To evaluate whether the frameworks satisfy these requirements, we first examined the
documentation for each framework to understand what process they claimed to use and to
identify the mechanisms they used for app-to-domain mappings. This led us to realize that




Apps indicate the domains they are associated with by including an Associated Domains
Entitlement file in their app package. Since this file is part of the app package, its contents
are signed as part of the code signing process required for all iOS apps. Domains indicate
the apps they are associated with by including an apple-app-site-association file at a
specific URL on that domain. This file indicates which apps are allowed to use credentials
for that domain, with the appropriate code signing key for the each app also being identified.
Credentials will only be autofilled if both of these mappings exist for a given domain.
To confirm that this functionality was working as intended, we created several testing
apps and domains. These apps included apps with the appropriate mappings and those
without. We also created look-alike apps that had all the same information as a legitimate
app, but which were not signed with the correct code signing key.
Throughout all of our testing, iOS Password AutoFill performed exactly as it should,
providing a secure credential-to-app mapping and satisfying P2.
iOS App Extensions
The iOS app extension framework does not provide a mapping between apps and domains.
Instead, it allows the app to arbitrarily dictate which domain’s credentials it would like to
have autofilled. This allows malicious apps to phish users’ credentials, putting the onus on
the user to detect that the malicious app should not receive the credentials suggested by
the password manager, which as previously discussed runs counter to how autofill dialogs
are supposed to work (see §4.1.2). We verified this behavior by building an app that uses
app extensions to autofill a login form and verifying that we could request credentials for
arbitrary domains.
Android Autofill Service
The Android autofill service does not provide a mapping between apps and domains, instead
leaving this functionality up to the individual managers to implement. To analyze the
mappings used by the 12 Android password managers we tested, we first inspected the autofill
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ceremony to see if domain-appropriate passwords were being suggested. If they were, we
used jadyx5 to decompile the password manager’s apk file and try to reverse engineer the
credential mapping. As part of this effort, we also used appmon6 to intercept API calls from
the password manager.
In our analysis, we identified four domain-to-app mappings used by the various managers:
(a) a static list of app-to-domain mappings; (b) a custom heuristic that matches apps to
domains based on the app’s applicationId (e.g., com.google.photos); (c) digital Asset Links
(DAL) files hosted by domains at a specific URL are used to specify which apps, identified
using their code signing key, should be mapped to that domain; and (d) relying on manual
mappings provided by end users. The list of these mappings along with their satisfaction of
P2 is given in Table 4.4, with further details available in Appendix D.
None of these managers use a bidirectional app-to-domain mapping. Only one mapping
(DAL) requires domains to identify the apps they are associated with. Only two managers
check a cryptographic attestation of app identity, meaning that look-alike and side-loaded
apps can impersonate legitimate apps and receive their associated credentials. As such, our
results demonstrate that while the autofill service’s decision to delegating mappings could
work in theory, in practice it turns out to be a poor design decision.
Finding #5: For native UI elements, iOS AutoFill correctly provides P2. In stark
contrast, iOS app extensions provide no credential-to-app mapping, allowing any app to
request credentials for domains. The Android autofill service leaves P2 up to managers
to implement, but this turns out to be a bad decision with no manager correctly
implementing such mappings.
4.4.3 P3—Protecting Filled Credentials
Filled credentials should only be accessible to the app receiving those credentials, not to
other apps or by webpages hosted in WebView controls within the filled app. For all three




each framework’s respective operating system. Note, these protections can be side-stepped
on Android using the accessibility service, but this is necessary to support individuals with
disabilities, and as such users need to remain careful about which apps they give permissions
to control this service.
Finding #6: Within native UI elements, P3 is enforced by the mobile operating
system.
4.5 WebView Autofill
We end our investigation by considering autofill within WebView controls hosted inside apps.
Such functionality is critical to enable a range of use cases:
1. Supporting single sign-on (SSO). As described in §4.4, autofill for native UI
elements should only be allowed if the domain owner indicates the app is associated
with the domain. As SSO providers are unlikely to whitelist every app that wants to
use SSO, apps can instead use an embedded WebView control to display the SSO flow.
2. Thin-wrapper apps. Many mobile apps serve as little more than a thin-wrapper
around an existing website, with the app displaying a WebView control that displays
the wrapped website.
3. Avoiding duplicating code. Instead of having one authentication codebase for use
on a website and one for the app associated with the website, app developers may
instead choose to have authentication handled by the website using a WebView control.
In each of these cases, it is important to ensure that credentials are filled safely. This
is especially important in the case of SSO, as those credentials if stolen would have a large
impact on the user’s life. An overview of our analysis of autofill security in WebView controls
is given in Table 4.5.
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1Password 3 # #
Avast Passwords 3 3 # #
Bitwarden 3 # #
Dashlane 3  #
Enpass 3 # #
Keepass2Android 3 # #
Keeper 3 3 # #
LastPass 3 3 # #
Norton 3 # #
RoboForm 3 # #
SafeInCloud 3 # #
Smart Lock 3 #  
3 Supports this functionality  Secure behavior # Insecure behavior
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Framework P1 P2 P3
iOS Password AutoFill   # # # # # # # #
iOS App Extensions  . # # # # # # #  
Android Autofill Service  . # # # # # # # .
 Secure behavior # Insecure behavior . Delegated to password manager
Highlighted columns refer to tests unique to or modified for WebView controls.
The remaining columns mirror the tests for mobile browsers.
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4.5.1 P1—User Interaction
We tested whether this property was supported by constructing a custom app with an
embedded WebView control and attempting to autofill the WebView content, recording
whether user interaction was required before credentials were filled. Our results show that all
three frameworks correctly require user interaction before filling credentials.
Finding #7: Within native UI elements, P1 is enforced by all frameworks.
4.5.2 P2—Credential-to-Domain Mapping
For WebView, credentials should be mapped based on the domain of the content displayed
inside the WebView. To test this, we created a test app mapped to one set of credentials, with
the test app including a WebView with content from a domain associated with a different set
of credentials. We then tried to autofill a login form within the WebView and examined the
set of credentials. In addition to this test, we also replicate the two connection security tests
used to evaluate mobile browser autofill.
Our results find that that iOS Password AutoFill correctly maps credentials to the domain
displayed in the WebView control. iOS app extensions and the Android autofill service
leave the mapping up to individual managers, with only a minority of using the correct
mapping scheme.7 In contrast, the majority of managers instead autofill credentials into the
WebView based on the credentials.8 This leaves the app credentials vulnerable to phishing
from compromised our malicious content displayed in the WebView, which we describe further
below. The remaining managers refuse to autofill credentials into WebView controls, a
significant limitation on utility.9
For the connection security tests, our results match the poor results for autofill within
mobile browsers.
7iOS app extensions—1Password, Android autofill service—Dashlane, Keeper, Lockwise, SafeInCloud,
and Smart Lock
8iOS app extensions—Keeper, Bitwarden, LastPass, and Enpass, Android autofill service—1Password,
Bitwarden, Enpass, Keepass2Android, Keeper, LastPass, and RoboForm.
9iOS app extensions—Avast, Norton, and Roboform, Android autofill service—Avast.
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Phishing Attack #1: Using a Malicious Webpage
In this phishing attack, a benign app uses a WebView to display content from a compromised
domain—either because the attacker compromised a domain normally used by the app (e.g.,
XSS attacks or supply chain attacks) or because the attacker used a different vulnerability
to get the app to load a domain of the attackers choosing. Once displayed, the malicious
domain displays a (possibly hidden) login form, triggering the autofill ceremony and causing
the password manager to suggest the user autofill the app’s associated credentials (as opposed
to the domain’s associated credentials) into the WebView. As the autofill dialog is intended
to give confidence to users that it is safe to enter credentials (see §4.1.2), it is unlikely
that they will even consider the possibility that a phishing attack is occurring. Moreover,
depending on the styling of the WebView and the content displayed therein, there may be no
visual indication that the user is interacting with content not native to the app (see §4.1.3),
eliminating nearly any chance that the user could detect a phishing attack.
To validate this attack, we developed a proof of concept app that displays content from a
different domain in a WebView. The displayed domain was considered to be under attacker
control and displayed a login form, styling the form to look as if it was part of the hosting
app. When the autofill framework suggested credentials, it was the app’s, not the domain’s
associated credentials. After clicking through the dialog, these credentials were sent to the
malicious domain, successfully completing the phishing attack. Based on our own experience
with this proof-of-concept app and prior work [19, 24, 40, 64], we believe it should not be too
difficult for adversaries to leverage this phishing attack in vulnerable managers.
Finding #8: Within WebView controls, only iOS Password AutoFill correctly maps
credentials to the domain of the content in the WebView. The remaining frameworks
leave this mapping up to the managers, with the majority of managers using an
incorrect mapping. This incorrect mapping leaves users vulnerable to a phishing attack
where benign app credentials can be stolen by compromised content displayed in the
WebView.
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4.5.3 P3—Protecting Filled Credentials
After filling credentials into the WebView, it should not be possible for the hosting app to
extract those credentials. Without this protection, it would be possible for a malicious app
to host arbitrary login forms from various domains to steal those credentials. To test this,
we created a demo app mapped to one set of credentials, with the demo app including a
WebView with content from a domain associated with a different set of credentials. After
autofilling credentials, we then attempted to use the hosting app to steal the credentials from
the WebView. In addition to this test, we also replicate the five P3 tests used to evaluate
mobile browser autofill.
We find that in each case, the WebView allowed the injection of malicious JavaScript
into the WebView by the hosting app, with this JavaScript able to find and exfiltrate filled
credentials. This leaves all of a user’s credentials vulnerable to phishing by a malicious app,
an attack describe more in-depth below.
For the remaining tests, our results match the poor results for autofill within mobile
browsers. Note, that if passwords were only filled on transmission, this would have addressed
the phishing attack described below.
Phishing Attack #2: Using a Malicious App
On both Android and iOS, the WebView control allows apps to inject JavaScript into any
webpage displayed in a WebView. A malicious app can use this feature to inject JavaScript
that waits for credentials to be filled into the WebView and then exfiltrate them back to
the malicious app. After injecting the appropriate code, the malicious app triggers the
autofill dialog by selecting the login elements hosted within the WebView, causing the autofill
framework to suggest the user autofill the domains’s associated credentials. The adversary
is also free to style the app, the WebView, and the content hosted in the WebView so that
it is impossible for the user to tell that they are interacting with a WebView—for example,
styling the WebView so that only a single text entry box (e.g., the username field) is shown,
with no indication that the textbox it is not a native UI element.
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As the autofill dialog is intended to give confidence to users that it is safe to enter
credentials (see §4.1.2), it is unlikely that they will even consider the possibility that a
phishing attack is occurring. Still, if the adversary were to immediately try to steal all the
user’s credentials, this would likely be detected as the user would be bombarded with hundred
of autofill dialogs. Instead, a careful adversary could stagger phishing attacks to instances
when the user expects to authenticate within the app, stealing credentials over a long period
of time.
We developed proof of concept apps for Android and iOS that implement this attack.
This apps is styled to look like the Walmart app and phishes credentials when users would
attempt to login. Listing 4.1 gives the critical code used to implement the attack. In
both apps, we were able to confirm that our app was able to trigger autofill requests for
arbitrary domains. Additionally, based on our experience with this app and past research
into phishing [19, 24, 40, 64], we believe it is unlikely that users would detect the attack.
Finding #9: Within WebView, P3 is not enforced, leaving filled credentials vulnerable
to malicious apps and other Web vulnerabilities.
4.6 Password Generation
In addition to evaluating autofill on mobile devices, we did conduct a less extensive analysis
of generation on iOS and Android. All but three of the password managers we evaluated
(Lockwise, Firefox, Edge) supported generation, though aWallet only offers this feature
in the paid version of their app. Three (iCloud Keychain, MyPasswords, Chrome) of the
password managers offered no configuration options in their password generator, while other
password managers had either basic configuration options (Avast, Keeper, LastPass, Norton)
or more advanced configuration options (1Password, Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass, RoboForm,
SafeInCloud, StrongGBox, aWallet, Password Safe). Figure 4.6 demonstrates the difference
between basic and advanced configuration.
Table 4.6 summarizes the options provided by each password manager’s generator. Several
of the password managers we analyzed (Avast, Bitwarden, Dashlane, Norton, SafeInCloud,
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1 let controller = WKUserContentController()
2 controller.add(self, name: "callbackHandler")
3
4 func userContentController(_controller: WKUserContentController, didReceive
message: WKScriptMessage) {
5 if(message.name == "callbackHandler") {
6 print("User credentials are \(message.body)")
7 }
8 }
(a) Malicious iOS app
1 var username = document.getElementById("email").value;
2 var password = document.getElementById("password").value;
3 var credentials = `window.location.hostname:username:password`;
4 window.webkit.messageHandlers.callbackHandler.postMessage(credentials);
(b) Injected JavaScript for iOS WebView
1 public class WebAppInterface {
2 Context ctx;
3 WebAppInterface(Context c) {ctx = c; }
4
5 @JavascriptInterface
6 public void stealCredential(String domain, String uname, String pword) {




(c) Malicious Android app
1 var uname = document.getElementById("email");
2 var pword = document.getElementById("password");
3 Android.stealCredential(window.location.hostname, uname.value, pword.value);
(d) Injected JavaScript for Android WebView
Listing 4.1: WebView Credential Exfiltration Scripts for iOS and Android
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aWallet, MyPasswords, PasswordSafe) default to lengths less than 16 characters, which
can result in trivially guessable random passwords being generated [48]. Dashlane, Norton,
aWallet, PasswordSafe are especially bad, defaulting to only 8 character passwords which are
easily broken by modern offline guessing attacks. The only password manager that did not
allow users to increase the length to at least 16 characters was Chrome, which only generates
15 character passwords.
In order to help users comply with password policy requirements, five of the password
managers studied (1Password, Bitwarden, Enpass, LastPass, Strongbox) allow users to specify
the minimum number of characters to include from each character set. 1Password and
Bitwarden allow control over only digits and symbols, defaulting to 1 digit and 0 symbols.
Enpass allows control over digits, symbols, and uppercase letters, defaulting to 1 of each.
LastPass only allows control over digits and defaults to 0. Strongbox does not allow fine
grained control, but has a “Pick characters from every group” option that enforces a minimum
of 1 character from each character set.
Several additional options were included in some password managers to enhance the
usability and memorability of generated passwords. Six (1Password, Bitwarden,Enpass,
RoboForm, Strongbox, aWallet, PasswordSafe) allowed users to avoid characters which are
difficult to distinguish from each other. Three (Enpass, SafeInCloud, Strongbox) allow user to
avoid characters which are difficult to pronounce. Five (1Password, Enpass, iCloud Keychain,
SafeInCloud, Strongbox) allow users to generate passphrases composed of dictionary words
with symbols as separators, such as “moot-tree-village”. Both Enpass and Lastpass store
a history of generated passwords, which increases usability in cases where the password
manager generates a password but that password is not properly stored later.
Most of the password managers that we evaluated saved the last used settings as the
new default settings, with no way to return to the original default configuration without
reinstalling the app. While this behavior could enhance usability, it can also lead to password
generation settings being left at those of the weakest password generated, as noted by Oesch
et al. [48]. For example, if a user generates an eight character password to satisfy a particular
password policy and they forget to change their settings, the next password they generate will
also only be eight characters. Only Avast and Keeper returned to default settings each time
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the user opened the password generator, but Avast’s default length is less than 16 characters,
so it is actually returning to an unsafe default configuration. RoboForm allowed users to
restore default settings, but did not do so automatically.
By default aWallet groups character classes—lowercase with lowercase, uppercase with
uppercase, symbols with symbols, and numbers with numbers (e.g. “pww!#&XDCJZ6”)—
and is the only password manager with this option. This approach can make it easier to enter
these passwords on different devices (e.g., a TV) [33], but requires that passwords be longer
to provide the same security as passwords without this grouping [43]. In aWallet’s case this
is problematic as the tool already defaults to small passwords (8 characters) and does not let
users know they need to increase their password lengths when this option is enabled.
4.6.1 Comparison to Desktop Managers
We found a lack of consistency between configuration options available on the desktop [48]
and in iOS, even within the same password manager. While this is not necessarily a security
issues, it could confuse users when they switch between platforms. In general, we believe
that this lack of consistency indicates a similar lack of clearly established best practices for
password generation.
4.7 Password Storage
We also conducted an analysis of storage on iOS similar to the analysis we conducted on
the desktop, but decided not to pursue the analysis on Android because we did not uncover
significant issues. While iOS does prevent apps from reading files (e.g., password vaults) for
other apps, there is always the potential that an iOS bug could be leverage to allow a malicious
app to read the password vault. As such, it is important that passwords and metadata stored
in the vault are properly secured. To evaluate password storage security, we first searched
the file system on our jailbroken device to find the password vault file used by each password
manager. We then used a combination of approaches (reverse engineering applications,
inspecting system calls, looking at source code, communicating with the developer, and
reviewing documentation) to determine the encryption algorithm used to protect this file,
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(a) Basic (Keeper) (b) Full (Bitwarden)
Figure 4.6: Examples of password generation configuration.
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1Password ld 24 4–64 3 3 .
Avast Passwords ls 9 4–30 3
Bitwarden ld 14 5–128 3 3
Dashlane ld 8 4–40
Enpass ls 50 4–100 3 3 3 3 3
iCloud Keychain lsd 20 20 3 3
Keeper lsd 20 8–51 3
LastPass lsd 16 8–64 3 3
Norton lsd 8 4–64
RoboForm lsd 16 4–511 3 .






StrongBox lsd 16 6–88 3 3 3 .
aWallet lsd 8 4–20 3




PasswordSafe ld 8 1–50 .
B Chrome ld 15 15
3 Default . Optional
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including the key derivation function (KDF) used to convert the user’s master password into
an encryption key that protects their vault. Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 summarize our findings.
4.7.1 Password Encryption
There were a variety of file types used to stored credentials: SQLite database with encrypted
cells (1Password, Avast, iCloud Keychain, Keeper, MyPasswords), a SQLite database that
was in an encrypted file (Bitwarden, Dashlane, SafeInCloud, PasswordSafe), SQLCipher
(Lockwise, Firefox), and other custom encrypted files (Enpass, LastPass, Norton, RoboForm,
aWallet). Chrome and Edge both store their passwords in the iCloud Keychain, but also
maintain a separate unencrypted database with additional metadata.
Other than PasswordSafe which encrypts its password vault using TwoFish-256, all
password managers encrypt the password vault using AES-256. Five of the password
managers (iCloud Keychain, Lockwise, Chrome, Edge, Firefox) generate a random encryption
key and store it using iOS’s secure enclave. While the details of the secure enclave are out
of scope for this work, we note that it provides adequate (if not ideal) protection for the
encryption keys [32]. The other password managers derive an encryption key by feeding the
user’s master password to a key derivation function (KDF).
Two password managers (Dashlane, StrongBox) support Argon2D, a memory-hard KDF
that is more resistant to offline attacks than PBKDF2. aWallet uses SHA256 as its KDF,
though with only 1,000 rounds, which is less than ideal. The remaining password managers
use PBKDF2, though several use 1,000 or fewer rounds(Norton, MyPasswords, PasswordSafe),
which, similar to SHA256, is less than ideal.
For the password managers that rely on a master password, most do not require strong
master passwords, making them vulnerable to offline attack and in some cases even online
attacks for vaults that are synced online. Only six (1Password, Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper,
Lastpass) met the NIST guidelines for passwords [31], though most just barely met these
requirements which may not be sufficient for high-value secrets like a master password. Five
(Avast, RoboForm, SafeInCloud, aWallet, MyPasswords) allow four character passwords and
three (Enpass, StrongBox, PasswordSafe) allow one character passwords.
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4.7.2 Metadata Privacy
Other than Chrome and Edge, which do not protect any metadata, all password managers
encrypted the username and url associated with a given password. The protection of other
metadata was less consistent. Five (1Password, Avast, Keeper, Chrome, Edge) stored the
creation and modification times in plaintext and five (Dashlane, Keeper, RoboForm, Chrome,
Edge) stored the email associated with the password manager in plaintext. Enpass does store
some user settings unencrypted (e.g., KDF rounds), though they are not private and any
attempt to change these settings would either cause Enpass to fail to load or be automatically
overwritten the next time Enpass was loaded.
Almost half of the password managers (1Password, Avast, Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass,
Keeper, Norton, RoboForm) store icons for each of the stored credentials. Dashlane fails to
encrypt these icons which could allow an adversary to learn what websites a user visits [48].
Four password managers (Enpass, Keeper, StrongBox, aWallet) offer to store attachments for
users, though Enpass and StrongBox leave an unencrypted version of the attachment in the
/tmp folder.
4.7.3 Comparison to Desktop Managers
Compared to desktop password managers [48], we find that browser-based password managers
are more secure due to their use of iOS’s secure enclave to store encryption keys for their
password vaults. We also find that managers generally use the same KDF settings on both
desktop and iOS. In regards to metadata privacy, we find that results are mixed for both
desktop and iOS, with some password managers providing good protections and others
providing poor protections.
4.8 Discussion
Our analysis provides a mixed message regarding the effectiveness of mobile autofill frameworks.
On the positive side, all frameworks enforce user interaction prior to autofill (P1), significantly
83
Table 4.7: Overview of Password Vault Encryption














1Password SQLite w/ encrypted cells AES-256 PBKDF2 100,000  
Avast SQLite w/ encrypted cells AES-256 PBKDF2 10,240 #
Bitwarden Encrypted SQLite file AES-256 PBKDF2 100,001  
Dashlane Encrypted SQLite file AES-256 Argon2D 3  
Enpass SQLCipher AES-256 PBKDF2 100,000 #
iCloud Keychain SQLite w/ encrypted values AES-256 Uses secure enclave
Keeper SQLite w/ encrypted cells AES-256 PBKDF2 100,000  
Lastpass Custom encrypted file AES-256 PBKDF2 100,100  
Lockwise SQLCipher AES-256 Uses secure enclave
Norton Custom encrypted file AES-256 PBKDF2 1,000  
RoboForm Custom encrypted file AES-256 PBKDF2 4,000 #







StrongBox KeePass or PasswordSafe file AES-256 Argon2D 2 #
aWallet Custom encrypted file AES-256 SHA256 1,000 #







PasswordSafe Encrypted SQLite file TwoFish-256 PBKDF2 256 #
Chrome iCloud Keychain Uses secure enclave






Firefox SQLCipher Uses secure enclave
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior # Insecure behavior - Not stored
MP = Master Password KDF = Key Derivation Function
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1Password   # #    -
Avast   # #    -
Bitwarden        -
Dashlane     #  # -
Enpass        G#
iCloud Keychain   - - - - - -
Keeper   # # #    
Lastpass       - -
Lockwise       - -
Norton        -
RoboForm     #   -







StrongBox        G#
aWallet       -  







PasswordSafe       - -
Chrome # # # # # - - -






Firefox       - -
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior
# Insecure behavior - Not stored
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improving upon the situation on the Desktop. Additionally, iOS password autofill fully secures
the autofill process for native UI elements in apps.
On the other hand, within mobile browsers, all frameworks failed to correctly check
credential mapping (P2) and none adequately protected filled credentials (P3), in many
cases being less secure than even the worst managers on desktop. Moreover, the frameworks
impeded the ability of managers to provide these properties themselves, leading the mobile
managers to be less secure then their desktop counterparts. These same issues cropped up for
autofill within WebView controls in apps, with other issues leading to our identification of
two phishing attacks enabled by the mobile autofill frameworks. Critically, for both attacks,
the password manager acts as a confused deputy, displaying the autofill dialog and suggesting
that the user fills the credential being targeted by the attack, a dialog which in all other
contexts indicates to the user that their credentials are not being phished (see §4.1.2).
Based on these findings, it is clear that current mobile autofill frameworks are not achieving
their potential. Still, based on their ability to enforce correct behavior, we do not believe they
should be abandoned, but rather fixed to properly secure the autofill process. To this end, we
conclude the paper with (a) recommendations for addressing the WebView phishing attacks
we identified, (b) providing guidelines for secure autofill framework implementations, (c)
identifying framework smells that indicate problematic framework designs, and (d) discussing
areas requiring additional research.
4.8.1 Addressing WebView Phishing Attacks
The simplest approach to addressing the WebView phishing attacks would be adopting the
proposal from Stock and Johns [60] to only fill credentials into Web requests, not the actual
webpage. To do this, the framework would fill fake credentials, then replace those fake values
right before they are sent over the wire, effectively preventing JavaScript, and by extension
apps, from accessing the filled credentials.
On desktop environments, it is not currently possible to implement this proposal as
browsers do not let extensions modify Web request contents and the manager vendors have
no control over the browser’s internals. In contrast, on mobile the same vendor maintains the
autofill framework, the mobile browser, and the WebView control. This integration allows
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the vendor to implement Stock and John’s proposal, and we strongly suggest they do so.
Note, that implementing this feature would fully enforce P3 for both WebView controls and
the mobile browser.
An alternative approach to addressing the WebView phishing attacks would be to modify
the WebView so that credentials will only be autofilled if the app has not injected JavaScript.
After filling the credentials, the WebView could also have a flag set that prevents the app from
injecting JavaScript until a new page is loaded (and by extension the credentials unloaded).
Such a prevention mechanism could be loosened for WebViews displayed for domains for
which their is an app-to-domain association already existing.
4.8.2 Recommendations for Secure Autofill Frameworks
1. Require user interaction. User interaction should be required. While far from a
perfect defense (phishing attacks are still possible), it does prevent silent credential
harvesting and at least gives users a chance to detect a phishing attack.
2. Authenticate domains. For both browsers and WebView controls, the identify of the
domain should be cryptographically verified using TLS. This will help prevent network
injection attacks from being able to access filled credentials.
3. Provide a cryptographically verified bidirectional app-to-domain mapping.
Frameworks should require that apps identify the domains they are associated with,
and this mapping should be included in the code signing process. Domains should
also be required to identify the apps that their credentials can be filled into, and this
mapping should use the code signing key’s fingerprint. Only when both these mappings
are in agreement should a given domain’s credentials be autofilled into an app.
iOS Password AutoFill already provides this property, and Android could provide
this property by expanding their existing DAL-based app-to-domain pairing scheme,
enforcing it at the framework level. While currently adoption of DAL is limited—we
analyzed 4,081 of the most popular paid apps and 9,345 of the most popular free apps
on the Play Store and found that only 10% of paid apps (n = 402) and 20% of free apps
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(n = 1879) were whitelisted by a DAL file—we believe that adoption would rapidly
increase if Google required such links for apps to be published or updated in the Google
Play Store.
4. Thoroughly evaluate webpages. While the proposal by Stock and Johns [60] full
achieves P3, until it is implemented frameworks should still carefully scan webpages
before autofilling credentials to help prevent accidental leakage of credentials. For
example, by checking the action and method fields on the form. Additionally, cross-
domain autofill should be disabled.
5. Thoroughly evaluate forms to be autofilled. The framework should check the
form to be autofilled, ensuring that the password is sent over HTTPS if it should be,
that the form is sending the password to the correct destination, and that only valid
password fields are being autofilled. These checks should be handled by the autofill
framework to ensure that all password managers receive these protections.
6. Allow password managers to override autofill decisions. While autofill
frameworks should attempt to fully satisfy P1–P3, our research shows that they often
fall short. Based on our discussion with manager vendors, we found that many of them
were aware of some of the limitations we identify in this paper, but noted that the
frameworks prevented them from addressing the issues, most commonly by failing to
provide the manager with sufficient information to enforce more secure behavior. This
situation could be partially rectified by providing the managers with copious
information about the autofill environment and process, then allowing the managers to
override autofill decisions as they deem necessary. This would be especially helpful in
situations where there are usability and security trade-offs for allowing or disallowing
autofill, allowing managers to cater to their individual customer bases.
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4.8.3 Autofill Framework Smells
Like code smells, framework smells are a sign that something is wrong with the underlying
autofill framework design. These framework smells can be detected by looking at how
password managers choose to implement autofill inside a given framework. In our analysis,
we identified two framework smells that are strong indicators of poor design.
Warnings. When password managers feel the need to issue autofill related warnings,
it may be a sign that the underlying autofill framework is flawed. While the absence of
warnings does not imply the framework is well implemented (we encountered almost no
warnings on iOS, yet there were still serious problems), their presence may indicate that
password manager vendors recognize that certain behaviors are insecure, but they feel they
have no other option. For example, Figure 4.7 shows warnings issued by password managers
on Android when they could not establish a secure mapping. In this case, the warnings are
indicative of the framework failing to satisfy our recommendation that frameworks enforce a
secure app-to-domain mapping.
Heuristics. Like warnings, when password managers use heuristics to make security
decisions, it may be an indicator that the autofill framework is flawed. For example, our
results found that many password managers on Android employ weak heuristics to map apps
to credentials, leading to serious security vulnerabilities. Similarly, we see various heuristics
used to determine whether autofill is safe on a given form (though far fewer than on desktop
where it is easier to implement these heuristics). In both cases, the heuristics only exist
because features are missing from the underlying autofill framework.
4.8.4 Future Research
In addition to addressing the issues identified in this paper, we identify three areas of future
research.
First, in this paper, we make the assumption that users are likely to fall for the phishing
attacks described in §4.5. Based on how easily these phishing attacks can be obscured, the
fact that the autofill dialog is supposed to indicate that phishing isn’t occuring, and the
copious research establishing the ease of phishing users generally [19, 24, 40, 64], we believe
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our assumption is sound. Still, future user studies could examine this attack, empirically
confirming its feasibility. Moreover, such research may also be also identify ways in which
the autofill dialog could be improved to protect users from phishing attacks.
Second, we believe that research needs to be conducted to design a mechanism that allows
a domain to indicate which webpages should be allowed to receive autofilled credentials. This
would prevent vulnerable webpages on the domain other than these login pages from being
able to steal users autofilled credentials, especially if password managers prevent autofill
within same-origin iframes. We believe this feature could be implemented similarly to how
mappings work for iOS Password AutoFill or DAL files, having a single file on the website
that lists acceptable URLs. Still, research is needed to identify the feasibility and effectiveness
of this proposal, along with the best way to implement it.
Third, research is needed on creating an autofill framework for desktop environments.
While browsers do provide a platform to deploy password manager extensions, they do not
actually provide any password management-centric functionality—i.e., they do not assist
with the detection of login forms nor facilitate autofilling credentials. This lack of framework
support causes a mixed level of security for password manager extensions. Moreover, there
is no OS-level autofill framework, making it nearly impossible for passwords managers to
provide universal autofill for desktop applications.
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”It basically started using me” - An
Observational Study of Password
Manager Usage
After analyzing the security of password managers on desktop and mobile platforms, we wanted
to understand how and why users use managers, so we conducted an observational interview
of password manager users on their own devices. Participants shared their mobile and desktop
screens via Zoom and demonstrated how they would normally use their manager as part of a
semi-structured interview about their manager usage. We believed that observation was an
important component to accurately assess user behaviors and hoped that this methodology
would yield new insights. That 6 of our 32 participants reported using a third-party password
manager when in fact they used Chrome’s built-in manager and that numerous participants
who reported using a single manager actually used multiple managers in practice, sometimes
in very unexpected ways, suggests that we were right about the importance of observation.
Also, because we observed usage on both participants’ laptop/desktop and mobile device, we
were able to identify cross-device issues that led directly to password reuse or significantly
impacted usability. For example, some participants reused passwords or created weaker
passwords because they knew they would have to enter those passwords on multiple devices,
or on devices where there manager would not be present.
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The interview contained task-based components where we observed users perform common
tasks such as account creation, login, and update, as well as questions related to manager
setup and configuration, adoption and promotion, password creation and sharing, and how
users identify compromised passwords. Because the interview was semi-structured, we asked
additional questions about interesting behaviors as they arose. Participants were recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk by first issuing a screening survey and then inviting selected
candidates to participate in the interview itself. Of the 1020 people who completed the
screening survey, we invited 456 to participate in the interview, 28 of whom both signed
up for and attended the interview. Because our survey design did not change significantly,
we also included data from the 4 individuals who took part in the pilot study in our final
analysis, for a total of 32 participants.
We followed a four-stage grounded theory approach during our analysis (open coding,
axial coding, selective coding, and theory generation). In the initial phase, three researchers
reviewed each transcript phrase-by-phrase and assigned codes, resulting in 572 unique codes.
In the axial coding phase, we used the constant comparative method to group codes into
concepts and then grouped concepts into related categories during the selective coding phase.
As we mapped out the concepts identified during coding 5 core theories emerged: multiple
manager usage, cross-device entry and reuse, limited usage on mobile, health check desired
but overwhelming, and patterns in adoption and promotion.
In our results section we discuss each of these theories in detail, as well as providing the
related concept map. We also discuss other relevant results outside of these core theories,
such as mental models of password reuse, why the password sharing feature of managers
is rarely used, and the impact of COVID-19 on manager usage, among others. Our key
contributions include:
• The first observational study of password manager users on their own devices. Also the
first study of password manager usage focused on third-party password managers such
as LastPass, 1Password, and Dashlane. Prior studies in this space included non-users
and users of manager built-in to the browser, with a comparatively small sample size of
third-party manager users.
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• The persistent availability of browser managers, along with concerns related to losing
passwords and cross-device syncing issues, lead users to adopt multiple managers, usually
a browser manager in addition their external manager, though sometimes to different
managers for desktop and mobile. We are the first to report on this phenomenon of
multiple manager usage, which is surprisingly common.
• Users need to enter credentials on devices without a password manager. This leads
them to eschew generating passwords, as those are a difficult to enter on such devices.
Additionally, fears of not having the password manager available when they need to
enter credentials drives users to prefer self-created, but memorable passwords over
generated passwords. These results explain the password reuse identified by Lyastani
et al. [41], who discovered that reuse still occurs among manager users and especially
among those who do not use their manager for the entire password lifecycle (creation,
storage, autofill).
• We found that users of built-in browser managers often adopted the manager without
any forethought. ”It basically started using” them, which explains why users of built-in
managers tend to be more focused on convenience than security [72]. They did not look
for a password manager to help them manage passwords or based on an advertisement
/ recommendation that explained why you should use a manager. They just saw the
manager pop-up and offer to generate, save, and fill their passwords, so they clicked the
pop-up and started to use it. In contrast, users of third-party managers often started
using them at work or based on a recommendation, both places that are more likely to
explain how a manager is intended to help you avoid reuse and demonstrate proper
usage.
• Usage of password managers on mobile devices is very limited. The reasons for this
are far-ranging: (1) inconsistent autofill and autosave functionality, (2) issues syncing
between desktop and phone password managers, (3) apps and websites that stay logged
in near-permanently on mobile, and (4) preference for SSO. Even if users do use a
mobile password manager, they often do not use password manager features such as
autofill and autosave, instead opting to copy and paste or manually enter passwords.
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5.1 Methodology
Prior user studies of password managers rely on user reported behaviors collected via
interviews, surveys, and post-task questionnaires, and tend to focus on either mobile or
desktop/laptop usage. In contrast, we conducted the first ever cross-device observational
interview, in which we observed password manager users complete a set of tasks on their
own devices via Zoom as part of a semi-structured interview. This IRB approved study
took place from January 25th to March 4th 2021, with 1020 individuals completing the
screening survey and 28 participating in the interview. Because our survey design did not
change significantly, we also included data from the 4 individuals who took part in an IRB
approved pilot study in our final analysis, for a total of 32 participants. Below we describe
our recruitment process, interview design, and analysis procedure, as well as participant
demographics and methodological limitations.
5.1.1 Recruitment
We recruited adult participants (aged 18 and over) using Amazon Mechanical Turk in two
phases. First, we sent out a screening survey (see Section E.1) to collect demographic data,
including which password manager the respondent used, and answers to questions regarding
password generation from the security behavior intentions scale (SeBIS) [20]. We also included
select questions from Masur’s online privacy concerns scale [42] that addressed both vertical
and horizontal privacy concerns. We initially tried to recruit Master Workers, those who
have consistently performed well across a varity of tasks, to ensure high quality responses,
but after receiving 101 responses from January 25th to January 28th 2021, only 18 of whom
indicated they would be willing to participate in a follow-up interview, we decided to include
non-Master Workers as well. By January 30th we had collected a total of 1026 responses to
the screening survey. We had to drop 6 responses because even though they completed the
survey, they failed to provide the survey completion code, so we had no way to link their
response to their Mechanical Turk ID, resulting in 1020 valid responses. Participants received
1$ in compensation for completing the screening survey.
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Next, we invited respondents to participate in the interview itself by completing a second
brief survey (see Section E.2) that included signing up for a Zoom interview, as well as
questions related to general security habits, device security, and software updates from the
SeBIS [20]. Initially we binned respondents into 6 buckets based on gender and age with the
goal of inviting an equal number of people from each bucket to participate in the interview.
But we soon altered our approach when only 3 of the first 24 people we invited actually signed
up for the interview and of those 3, 1 did not attend the scheduled appointment. Ultimately,
we ended up inviting 456 people to participate in the interview, with 28 actually participating.
We stopped at 28 participants because we believed we had reached saturation. We conducted
these interviews from February 16th to March 4th, 2021. On average interviews took 35-40
minutes and participants received 26$ in compensation. Consent forms for both the screening
survey and the interview can be found in the Appendix (Sections E.5 and E.4, respectively).
The 4 pilot study participants were recruited via convenience sampling and were all
researchers and/or engineers who worked with one of the authors. An email was sent out
inviting coworkers who used password managers to participate in the pilot study, and those
who responded in the affirmative were included. Only minor modifications were made to the
interview design as a result of the pilot study, mostly related to ensuring participants were
able to share their screen on all relevant devices and utilize the provided temporary account
for their password manager prior to beginning the recorded portion of the interview. The
pilot studies took place from January 6th-13th, 2020. Throughout this chapter, we refer to
pilot study participants with a ’P’ prefix (P1-P4) and MTurk participants with an ’R’ prefix
(R1-R28).
5.1.2 Interview Design
We designed the interview so that we observed participants using their password managers
on their own devices via Zoom. Whenever possible, we asked participants to demonstrate
specific behaviors during or prior to questions regarding those behaviors. The interview itself
was semi-structured and while the interviewer followed a guide (see Section E.3) walking
them through what questions to ask and how to guide the participant, they were encouraged
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to engage in fruitful dialogue and explore any interesting use cases that arose. For continuity,
a single researcher conducted all 32 interviews.
Participants were given an overview of the purpose of the research and the interview
structure, as well as a reminder that the interview would be recorded. To encourage
participants to accurately represent their behaviors, we reminded them that any problems
they were having reflected issues with password managers and not with them personally. We
also encouraged participants to interject whenever something they thought would be helpful
occurred to them.
Prior to starting the recorded portion of the interview, we made sure participants were
able to share their screen from both their desktop and mobile device (if they used mobile). We
also had participants log out of their password manager on all relevant devices to protect their
privacy before we started recording. Once we ensured that the participant was comfortable
with sharing their screen via Zoom from all relevant devices, we began the recorded portion
of the interview.
First, we asked questions related to general usage, such as how participants protected their
password manager accounts, such as how they created their master password and whether or
not they use 2FA. We also asked how they chose this particular password manager, whether
they ever recommend it to others, and if others adopted it based on their recommendation.
Then we asked if they ever saved passwords anywhere other than their primary password
manager, such as in the browser or on a notepad.
Second, we had participants login to their password manager with a temporary account
that we provided and show us if there were any settings they would change when first
configuring their manager on a new device. We then had them create an account on both
reddit and ebay, walking us through how they would normally create an account. During
account creation, we asked participants if they had issues when creating or saving accounts,
and about their password creation strategies.
Third, we had participants log back in to those same two accounts, asking questions
about how they utilize autofill. Once participants had logged in, we had them update their
password for both accounts. We then asked them questions about their password updating
habits.
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Fourth, we asked partiicpants about their password creation and storage habits for different
types of websites, their use of the autolock feature of their manager, and whether or not they
filled passwords into apps on their desktop. These questions often led to fruitful discussions
around important versus nonimportant accounts, device privacy, and edge cases for autofill.
Fifth, we asked participants how they normally go about sharing passwords and, if they
were not already aware of it, demonstrated the password sharing feature of their password
manager. We also asked how participants would normally check if their passwords had been
compromised in a data breach and demonstrated the health check feature of their manager if
they were unaware. Both of these questions led to extended discussions around password
sharing and auditing behaviors. We then asked participants if there were any additional
features they used that we had not yet mentioned (e.g. secure notes)
At this point we had participants stop sharing their desktop screen and pivoted to their
mobile device. Regardless of whether they used their password manager on their mobile
device, we began with an open ended question about how password management was different
on their mobile device than on their desktop. We then asked them whether they created
accounts on their phone, how they logged into websites and apps on their phone, and if they
created/generated passwords on their phone.
If they used any password manager, including the one built into their phone’s OS, on
their mobile device, we had them share their mobile screen and demonstrate those behaviors
they regularly practiced. Depending on their answers to prior questions, we had them login
to reddit using the account we just created to help us understand how they sync between
devices and how they utilize autofill on mobile. We also had them create, log out of, and log
back into an account in the memrise app if they used a manager for apps.
Finally, we had them stop sharing their mobile screen, if necessary, and wrapped up with
a few closing questions. The first question was open ended and provided participants an
opportunity to share anything else they felt we would find helpful. We then asked what
feature they would add or thing they would change about their manager, if any, and closed
by thanking participants for their time and explaining compensation.
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5.1.3 Addressing Potential Risks
Because we did observe participants using their own personal devices, we took several steps
to protect their privacy. First, we reminded them at the beginning of the interview that we
would be recording them on their own devices and gave them an opportunity to opt-out.
Second, we had users log out of their password managers before we started recording, and
then had them login to a temporary account that we provided. Third, we had users disable
their video feed prior to recording just in case it exposed any private information. And fourth,
when we uploaded the interviews for transcription, we only uploaded the audio just in case
any private information was exposed in the recordings.
We also note that there was a potential benefit for participants. Many participants said
that they learned new things about their manager through this interview. And after the
interview was over, we were able to help several participants understand their manager better,
which was particularly important for several of the participants who had recently had an
account breached.
5.1.4 Analysis
We used an automated online transcription service to transcribe the interviews, followed by a
pass from one of our researchers to verify accuracy. Only the audio file was uploaded to the
transcription service to avoid the possibility of leaking any sensitive information contained in
the video we may have overlooked. The transcribed interviews, along with artifacts of the
analysis, are available at [redacted].
We followed a four-stage grounded theory approach during our analysis (open coding,
axial coding, selective coding, and theory generation). In the initial phase, three researchers
reviewed each transcript phrase-by-phrase and assigned codes. Codes were primarily assigned
via open coding (the code summarizes the participant’s statement), though some in situ codes
were generated (using the participant’s own words as the code). We used contextual clues to
ensure our codes were accurate, as well as revisiting the video recordings when uncertain to
more closely examine participant actions and hear their tone. After completing open coding,
we had a total of 572 unique codes.
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In the axial coding phase, we used the constant comparative method to group codes into
concepts. When two codes were describing the same phenomena, we collapsed them into a
single code. Otherwise, we grouped codes underneath concept headings rather than collapsing
them so that we could easily revisit what codes made up a concept and move codes back and
forth between concepts as we iterated.
In the third stage, we grouped concepts into related categories, drawing and labeling
connections between both concepts and categories using concept maps. Five key categories
emerged from this analysis: multiple manager usage, cross-device entry and reuse, limited
usage on mobile, health check desired but overwhelming, and patterns in adoption and
promotion. We discuss each of these categories in detail and provide the concept maps for
each in Section 5.2.
Finally, we used the categories and connections between them, the concept maps, and our
research notes and observations to generate theories about how people use their password
managers. We developed one theory for each of the five categories that we identified, as well
as exploring the implications of our other results. Given that these theories are based on
observational interviews with 32 individuals, they are not conclusive, but are grounded in the
data that we collected.
5.1.5 Participant Demographics
Our population was roughly 2/3 male (22/32 participants) and was predominantly composed
of individuals between the ages of 21 and 44, with only 4 participants 45 or above. We had
23 participants who identified as Caucasian or White, 4 as Black or African American, 4 as
Asian, and 1 as Hispanic or Latino. A majority of our participants had either a Bachelors (11),
Masters (8), or some college (5). One participant held a doctorate, and several had either an
Associates (2), High School or GED (2), or a Professional degree (3). Following an approach
similar to that of Tan et al. [61], we considered participants technical if they reported that
people asked them for computer-related advice and that they knew a programming language.
Approximately half of our participants were technical by this measure (17 in total).
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5.1.6 Limitations
Because interviewees may desire to appear knowledgeable to the interviewer in the context of
a semi-structured interview, it is possible they reported security practices better or different
than their normal behaviors. [2] Likewise, it is possible that direct observation aletered
participant’s behavior [51]. We encouraged participants to behave naturally by observing
them on their own devices, verbally nudging them to do what they would normally do,
and above average payment, however, we cannot exclude that some participants behaved
unusually.
We also targeted MTurk users who live in the US, a group that tends to be younger, better
educated, and more privacy conscious than the general population [37]. Future work could
replicate this study with different populations, as well as use more quantitative, large-scale
approaches to explore specific observed phenomena.
5.2 Core Theories
We used grounded theory to identify five theories in the data from our interviews that explain
how people use password managers. In this section we explain each of these five theories,
provide the associated concept map that visualizes these theories from our data, and discuss
additional important topics that arose in our study. Significantly, several of these theories
describe phenomena never before observed in prior research, such as the simultaneous use
of multiple managers, and shed new light on known issues, such as password reuse among
password manager users.
5.2.1 Adoption of multiple managers
This study was designed with the expectation that users of external managers such as LastPass,
1Password, or Bitwarden would only use that manager. However, by observing participants
on their own devices we found that the usage of multiple managers in tandem, generally a
browser manager (e.g. Chrome) in addition to an external manager (e.g. LastPass), was
very common among our participants. We also observed some participants using a different
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manager on their phone versus on their desktop. To our knowledge, we are the first to
report on this phenomena. Figure 5.1 shows the concept map for multiple manager usage,
highlighting the causes and resultant behaviors.
The most common instance of multiple manager usage was storing passwords in both
the browser and external manager. This behavior was motivated by three key factors: (1)
Participants scared of losing their passwords used the browser as a failsafe, (2) Participants
stored their most commonly used websites in both managers for convenience, (3) Participants
used the browser manager without forethought because it popped up and offered to save
their credentials. The below quotes demonstrate behaviors (1) and (3).
Browser as failsafe - R9: “I do have them (passwords) in Chrome as well, only
because I have this horrible phobia that I’m going to, like LastPass or something
like, oh, no, something’s gonna blow up. Like, I’m going to forget the password
and not be able to sign in, something’s gonna happen. And I kind of want to just
have a backup. Oh, I just I’m paranoid like that.”
Storing in browser without forethought - R13: “I guess when I said I would click
on and save it (in browser manager). It’s sort of just out of habit of clicking a
popup. I’m kind of always like, just get the pop up out of here.”
The quote from R13 demonstrates some annoyance with the autosave dialogue popup
generated by the browser and points to a common theme among users who utilized multiple
managers on the same device. One manager often interfered with the other one because it
duplicated functionality. The below quote from R12 demonstrates this type of interference
with both the autofill and autosave features, which actually led to this participant’s two
managers being out of sync with one another.
Browser manager interferes external manager - R12: “Yeah, if it autofills, it’s
kind of like first come first serve. If Google (Chrome) gets in there and autofills it
before I have the chance to tell LastPass. It does cause some problems. So when
I’ve updated a password somewhere out there in Google and now Google is out of
sync with LastPass.”
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We also found that some participants used different managers on their phone and desktop,
as demonstrated by the quote from R17 below, or used multiple managers on their phone.
These phenomena are tied to the reality that managers are used in only a limited fashion on
mobile devices, which we will discuss in more detail later. However, it is worth noting here
that the main reason participants used multiple managers on their phone is that the manager
built-in to the OS (Apple or Android) offered to save their passwords and even though they
had not originally intended to save it in their phone’s manager they did so just to get past
the popup (see quote from R12 below).
Different manager on destkop and mobile - R17: “Yeah. So I have an iPhone and
on my phone, I use the apple password manager for everything, passwords, credit
card information, debit card information. And then on my computer, my desktop
or my laptop, I actually use Chrome.”
Unintentional usage of phone manager - R12: “I do but not intentionally. Chrome
picks them (passwords) up sometimes. And I don’t stop it is what it boils down
to.”
Using multiple managers led to situations where participants had to manually enter their
passwords to ensure they were saved in both managers, or autofill with one manager and
then save with the other (when both managers were on the same device). These frustrations
with syncing bewteen multiple managers led R17 to share the following:
Multiple manager usage leads to syncing issues - R17: “I would want to make it
so that like, Apple and Chrome could marry one another, like, oh my goodness,
you know, like so passwords can transfer easily.”
The most extreme case of multiple manager usage was R7, who used Safari at home,
Chrome at work, and aWallet on their phone. They used Safari because it synced passwords
between their personal devices, Chrome because they used PCs at work, and aWallet for
their most senstive accounts and accounts that they needed to access when not near their
personal computer. Several participants did intentionally avoid using multiple managers,
either because they recognized it was unsafe to store their passwords in multiple locations
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or because they felt the browser manager was less secure than their external manager. And
some participants who felt it was unsafe to store their most sensitve accounts in a manager
stored them in plaintext (Word file or in a notebook), which could be considered another
form of multiple manager usage.
5.2.2 Cross-device entry and reuse
Users need to enter credentials on devices without a password manager. This leads them to
eschew generating passwords, as those are a difficult to enter on such devices. Additionally,
fears of not having the password manager available when they need to enter credentials
drives users to prefer self-created, but memberable passwords over generated passwords. The
following quotes from R4 and R21 demonstrate each of these concerns, respectively, and
Figure 5.2 provides the concept map exploring password reuse.
Generated passwords hard to remember and enter cross-device - Interviewer: “If I
told you that it’s not really secure to create passwords the way that you’re creating
them, but it was more secure to use the password generator, do you think that
would motivate you to start using the password generator?”
R4: “It would not. And the reason for that is that the password generator will
give you like a bunch of gibberish letters, there’s no way you could ever remember
it. So let’s say if you’re outside and you’re on your mobile and you want to, you
know, go to the website that you haven’t been to on on the phone, chances are like
good luck remembering that password, you would never log in.”
Fear of not having manager available prevents use generated passwords - R21:
“Like I’m very, very set in my ways in which passwords I use. So if they have too
many, you know, special characters or numbers, I feel like not going to use that.
So just in case the Chrome password manager craps out on me, it’ll be easier for
me to remember.”
However, we also found that in some cases the password manager did stop reuse and
result in the use of the generator to create strong, unique passwords. Figure 5.3 provides the
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Half of participants used multiple managers due to issues syncing between devices, fear of
not having their main manager available, and simply because the manager built-in to the OS
or browser was persistently available. Only a few participants specifically avoided multiple
manager usage, generally due to concerns about saving their passwords in too many places.
Figure 5.1: Concept map for multiple manager usage.
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concept map exploring the cause and effects of stopping reuse. Generally this occurred when
the person adopted the password manager specifically to stop reuse (adopted for security
rather than convenience) or when the password manager was so usable cross-device that they
were not concerned about the availability of their passwords. An example of usability driving
the creation of strong passwords is given below, where R10 used all Apple devices and found
that the passwords synced between them seamlessly, which gave them no reason to question
whether or not it was safe to use the generator.
Usability of password manager leads to using generator to create strong passwords
- R10: “Years and years ago, um, you know, I tried to use a system or like, I’d
use the same base password and kind of modify it, depending on the site... You
know, currently using keychain, I just let it generate the password and hit OK...
And I really like the password generation feature to which I mean, I know that’s
not exclusive to keychain, but since it can do it like right in the browser, wherever
I’m working. It’s very beneficial. And then, you know, it just works well between
my phone and my iPad and my computer where I don’t have to worry about like
syncing them or anything like that. It just kind of natively does the work for me.”
In some cases participants used the generator even though it made it difficult to enter
passwords on other devices and different participants had different coping mechanisms. For
example, R28 (quote below) created easier to enter passwords without the generator if those
passwords would be entered on alternate devices. Another user who used all Apple devices but
did not use keychain as their manager utilized AirDrop to sync passwords and a number of
participants simply typed them in manually, though most participants who entered manually
avoided the generator altogether.
R28: “I want to say though I do have like one or two that are ones that I made
more frequently logging in from a separate device and don’t want to deal with
Dashlane, where those have a similar thing of a sentence that I remember with
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Password reuse was common in spite of the fact that all participants used a manager. While
several users simply did not understand why reuse is bad, we found that most reuse was do
to usability issues with cross-device entry. Users felt generated passwords are difficult to
remember and enter manually on other devices, so they reused common passwords instead.



















































Some participants adopted a manager specifically to stop their own reuse of passwords or
stopped reusing after adoption, instead using the password generator. Of those participants
who used the generator, some increased the length of generated passwords or used the
strength meter, resulting in extremely strong passwords.
Figure 5.3: Concept map for when managers stop reuse.
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5.2.3 Limited usage on mobile
Among our participants, usage of password managers and their features on mobile devices
was very limited. The reasons for this are far-ranging: (1) inconsistent autofill and autosave
functionality, (2) issues syncing between desktop and phone password managers, (3) apps
and websites that stay logged in near-permanently on mobile, (4) limited usage of mobile
device, and (5) preference for SSO. Even if users do use a mobile password manager, they
often do not use password manager features such as autofill and autosave, instead entering
passwords manually into their mobile manager and then copying and pasting into login fields.
Figure 5.4 provides the concept map exploring mobile usage and inconsistencies in manager
behavior.
First of all, it is important to recognize that syncing between desktop and mobile is
not intuitive for many users. As demonstrated by the quotes below, some participants did
not even have a method for saving accounts that they created on their phone, while other
participants would manually enter those credentials into their desktop manager at their
earliest convenience. For those participants concerned about security, syncing issues actually
led some to create easier to remember passwords if they made a new account on their phone
while away from home, and then create a stronger password once they got home and could
save those credentials in their desktop manager. Several participants, such as R2 quoted
below, were not even aware that their manager offered a mobile solution—their mental model
of password managers simply did not include the idea of a mobile manager.
Not saving accounts created on mobile - Interviewer: “How do you remember the
password the next time? (after creating an account on mobile)”
R25: “I don’t. That’s the problem. Yeah, I don’t like because right now like
Facebook, I know my password. So I can log in if I wanted to. But like say I
didn’t know the password. I would have to just go back to the app or go onto my
computer or reset it or something like I just wouldn’t be able to.”
Using desktop manager to save mobile credentials - R2: “And as I said, like,
I don’t use LastPass on my phone, yet, I’ll go on my computer to see if like a
certain app password is saved on LastPass. And that’s been helpful to log into a
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lot of things that I normally would have had to change the password, because I
would never have remembered what symbols were in them.”
Other key underlying factors behind limited usage of mobile managers and their features
include limited usage of mobile in general (see R21’s response below), the fact that some
people remain logged in near permanently on mobile (see R19’s respoinse below), and a
tendency to only use the mobile manager to sync passwords from the desktop and then copy
and paste rather than utilizing autofill or autosave (see R1’s response below).
Only visits limited websites on mobile - R21: “And I started doing it on that to
some degree, but there’s only like, probably less than 10 websites where I have my
password saved on my phone. Like, my laptop has a lot more.”
Logs into websites infrequently on mobile - R19: “I don’t log into sites nearly
as often on my phone. When I first set up the phone, I used it to actually
authenticate into Reddit and authenticate into other things. But those remain
logged in throughout the lifetime of the app as long as you’re not, you know,
logging out of it.”
Only uses mobile manager as reference book - R1: “But in the sense I only use it
as like a reference book. If I had a book with me, with all my passwords in it, I
would look one up. That is what I use it for.”
Another factor preventing the usage of mobile manager features such as autosave and
autofill is that they are inconsistent on mobile, so participants are forced to adapt other
strategies when these features fail and may abandon these features altogether. While in many
cases autofill or autosave simply did not work with a specific app or website, in others autofill
did not offer the stored credential for security reasons. iOS checks a special digital asset link
file on a website before autofilling an app to ensure that the app is allowed to access those
credentials, and it will not offer the credentials otherwise. However, none of the participants
understood that this app to website mapping even existed or that there was such a security
feature, so they simply perceived this behavior as an annoying inconsistency. As expressed by
R11 below, these inconsistent behaviors caused frustration for many users, and often resulted
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in users copying and pasting credentials and manually creating accounts rather than trying
to rely on inconsistent manager features.
R11: “My biggest annoyance with the Google and the Android OS password
system is its inconsistency. It’s just it sometimes works, and sometimes it doesn’t.
Sometimes it does what you expect it to do and other times it doesn’t.”
5.2.4 Breach notifications desired, but health check overwhelming
Users are interested in learning when their credentials have been compromised and are
willing to change them for accounts they consider important. For this reason, participants
appreciate breach notifications informing them when important accounts are compromised.
However, users often find the health check warnings produced by password managers to be
overwhelming because they show dozens of weak/reused passwords and breached accounts,
leading them to dismiss those warnings as opposed to figuring out which accounts they do
need to update. (i.e., targeted better than fire hose). The below quote from R12 demonstrates
this tension between feeling overwhelmed and wanting to keep accounts safe, and Figure 5.5
explores users approaches to auditing their accounts and health check.
Health check overwhelming and therefore ignored - R12: “It’s a very cool feature.
However, it’s, you know, the duplicate password thing, like, there’s a bunch of
passwords I’ve never changed, because they don’t have any financial implications
for me. And so it just comes up every time. And so it’s kind of become background
noise for me, that when I click in, it pops up and says, “Hey, you have a duplicate
password here”. And then I go, oh, yeah, I gotta change that. And that’s been
about, I don’t know, four or five years? I don’t know. No, I don’t remember how
long anyways, it’s a lot, you know, it’s just white noise at this point, I just kind
of dismiss it immediately. And there’s an option to turn it off permanently. But I
don’t want that because someday I’m actually gonna take care of it.”
Participants generally fell into three categories regarding their approach to updating their







































































































Users generally did not mind inconsistencies in autofill and autosave on the desktop, though
they did want their manager to integrate better with their browser for a variety of reasons.
However, mobile managers were especially unreliable, to the point that users often resorted
to manual password entry and copy and paste. Given that many users remained logged in on
mobile anyways, some users simply avoided the mobile manager altogether.
Figure 5.4: Concept map for limited manager usage on mobile devices.
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so if required (see quote from R12 below), (2) Those who periodically audited their own
accounts, both by updating passwords (R26 below) and/or removing unused accounts from
their manager (R11 below), and (3) Those who found updating passwords to be annoying
and did so only if required. Those participants who fell into category (1) or (2) liked being
notified when their accounts were breached, but many still found health check to be too noisy
/ overwhelming to use it frequently. In contrast to health check, which required participants
to navigate to another page in the UI, many participants liked Chrome’s password breach
notification popup, though they still found this overwhelming. Overall, these results suggest
more targeted popup breach notifications that could be disabled would be welcome and
satisfy users in all three categories.
Interviewer: “And how often would you say you, you update passwords?”
Only updates passwords if required - R12: “It’s not I’m not proud of it, but about
never. Yeah. things require me to basically, which a lot of important places do
require me to banks and credit cards and things like that. But even they may be
only required once a year, you know? Where probably should be frequent than
that.”
Self-auditing - updates important accounts periodically - R26: “I would say maybe
once or twice a year. I should probably do it more often, but... I would say
typically the high priority ones, and then if there’s something that just prompts me
to change it for the other ones, I might do it as well, you know, you just read that,
you know, there was a compromise of you know, 20,000 accounts. For example, I
might just decided to change it as well, even if it’s not too hypercritical.”
Self-auditing - removes unused websites - R11: “But there’s a lot of those websites
aren’t around anymore. So I do I need to remove them. So, usually I’ve gone
through, I have over 200 (accounts saved) and I’ve knocked it down to 97. So but
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While some users only cared about convenience and did not update passwords even if their
accounts were breached, most users would update passwords for breached accounts and
found breach notifications helpful. However, health check results were often overwhelming
when first checked because users had so many weak/reused passwords. The result was that
most users simply avoided health check. Users who self-audited accounts were the most
likely to use or want to use health check in its current form.
Figure 5.5: Concept map for account auditing and health check.
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5.2.5 Adoption and promotion
Users generally adopt a password manager for three reasons: (1) requirements to use a
password manager at work (see quote from R16 below), (2) it makes their life easier, and/or
(3) it allows them to increase the security of their online credentials. Most users like their
password managers, but only about half of participants were active promoters. For those
that are active promoters, success is limited, with most of that success coming from family
members or very close friends. When selecting a manager, users rely on online or personal
recommendations (see quote from R26 below). Figure 5.6 provides the concept map for
adoption and Figure 5.7 provides the concept map for promotion.
Adoption due to work - R16: “Actually, I didn’t pick it. My job started forcing it.
And then I just got used to it. I might as well just put it on my phone.”
Adoption based on recommendation - R26: “That was actually pretty much the
first one that kind of popped up. You know, when I was looking for password
manager (online). I did speak with friends and there is one friend that was using
it and had just a good personal experience with it.”
Interestingly, several active promoters of passsword managers felt that they were
unsuccessful because other people did not have an accurate mental model of how a manager
works. For example, R23 below struggled to help people understand that if they used a
password manager they would only need to remember a single password (not many), and
struggled to convey why reuse is bad even if the password you reuse is ”hard to guess”.
Interviewer: “Why do you think no one adopts a manager when you recommend
it?”
R23: “No one understands utility, or they just can’t wrap their mind around
how they would use a password manager because they’re always trying to think
well I have to remember all these different password No, you don’t remember one
password. Yeah, that’s why I think I have no converts.”
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P1: “A lot of times, it’s something to the effect of no one would guess my password.
So why worry about it? And then you explain, algorithms don’t care about whether
it’s hard to guess.”
Several participants also shared that getting their parents to adopt a manager required
the manager to be very easy to use, which is why they tended to recommend browser-based
managers for their parents rather than more fully featured solutions. For example, R10
highlights that because keychain was so easy to use and did not require you to manage
anything yourself, from syncing to generation, he was able to get his mother to adopt it.
R10: “Yeah, so my mother. You know, who has, you know, uses either myself
or my sister as technical support. She’s not gonna remember a complex password
by any means. And her default is to use her cat’s name as a password. In this
day and age, she just simply cannot do that for banking, or, you know, brokerage
accounts or anything like that. It’s just, you can’t do it. So we showed her how
to, you know, use keychain herself. And it pretty much, you know, takes care of
anything you have to do for you, especially if you’re using it on your phone, and
you could use face ID or whatever, like, you know, once you know how to use it,
there’s no work involved, and she’s willing to do it. Whereas, for something more
complicated, she wouldn’t be willing to.”
5.3 Additional Topics
5.3.1 Password sharing via manager difficult and rarely used
Most users rarely need to share passwords and, when they do, it’s generally for unimportant
accounts (e.g. Netflix) where they are not concerned about texting / emailing the password
and with people who do not have the same or any password manager (see quotes from P3 and
R26 below), so they could not use their manager’s sharing feature regardless. One participant
had attempted to share a password with a friend via LastPass, but found it difficult to






















































Participants who adopted managers on their own generally did so either for the sake of
convenience or to keep their accounts more secure. When participants adopted a manager
based on a recommendation, it generally came from a friend or family member or a
requirement to adopt a manager at work.

























































Participants were most successful at promoting managers to immediate family members,
parents, or close friends. Promotion in casual conversations was unsuccessful and several
participants mentioned that promotion failed due to inaccurate mental models of how
managers work.
Figure 5.7: Concept map for promotion.
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below). Most users who shared important passwords, such as banking accounts, did so with
their immediate family members (often with a spouse) and either shared the same manager
account or used passwords that they both were familiar with to avoid the hassle of password
sharing. One participant did mention that sharing via the manager might allow them to have
a separate account from their spouse, which they felt might be helpful. Several participants
also mentioned that this feature would be more useful at work, where they needed to share
more senstive accounts with other employees.
Doesn’t know anyone who has a password manager - P3: “Most people are too
lazy to set up a password manager. So I’ll just send an email or something.”
R26: “Most of the people that have been in the scenario that you mentioned (need
to share password), I don’t believe are dashlane users. So it’s probably a feature
I’ve heard of, but I don’t think it’s a feature I’ve ever actually used. But I would.”
Password sharing via LastPass hard to use - R12: “I did this (password sharing)
with a friend. He was sharing with me using LastPass. And I figured with LastPass
everything would be pretty normal. But no, it came through and wanted, like,
oh, I had to accept it. And then he got a notification. And then there’s some
temporary password that just doesn’t give me his actual password. It does some
sort of encryption... It’s kind of like those blue boxes, right, you know the the
door locks for your house where you, you can authorize somebody to come in at
one time and then you delete it right? That is the same thing. Except for like I
said it didn’t work. And then he shared it with me for a minute. And it popped in
and out of six times. And every time I tried to use it, it would not work. And so
he just ended up texting the password to me.”
5.3.2 Mental models of password reuse
Participants generally fell into three categories in terms of their mental model of password
reuse: (1) They thought that having one very strong password (see R14 below) or a strong
master password (see R1 below) made reuse okay, (2) They knew that reuse was bad and
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either did not care or preferred convenience over security (see R9 below), or (3) They adopted
a password manager specifically to stop reuse (see R19 below).
R1: “10 years ago, when I was taking my security plus course, for the certification.
They had a password cracker there. Well, I ran my normal passwords, and they
got it pretty quick. And I ran my master password through. It said oh it would
take 500,000 years to find that password. Then I said okay, I know what I’m doing
now.”
R14: “I’ve been using them password that I have for 20 years. You know what I
mean? It’s not, it’s not like my pet’s name or my dad or whatever, something
like that. It’s like a, I don’t know, abstract, obscure, weirdo password that no be
like, Oh, yeah, it is Richard Nixon. You know, I mean, like, it’s not, it’s not
something that’s gonna be, you know, super related to me, it has nothing to do
with something like that.”
R9: “Um, I have like, a few that I just kind of use in rotation. Which is probably
not the best thing. But there we go.”
R19: “I was concerned about me just using a handful passwords, although they
were fairly strong passwords, you know, they’re quite long. And we’re very, you
know, like, sort of like just random strings of letters and numbers, like I was
always trying to use long passwords. I only use like one or two of them. And I
just felt like that wasn’t a good practice. So I wanted to get into a habit of using
more.”
5.3.3 Inconsistencies in autofill and autosave
While we already explained how mobile inconsistencies lead users to use managers less on
their phones, we also found that users experience many inconsistencies with both autofill and
autosave using managers on their desktop devices. R14 describes a common problem that
occurred when the username field and password field are on separate pages, which confuses
the manager and prevents autofill from functioning correctly. And P1 shares a common
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concern with autosave where the password they generated is not saved and they did not store
it, so they write it down to make sure they don’t lose it if autosave fails. For both autosave
and autofill, users often blamed either the website (see R12 below) or themselves (see R28)
rather than the manager.
Inconsistencies in autofill - R14: “Yes, sometimes like, I don’t know how to explain
it. It will do like a like, for example, my bank. Okay, you got to put your username
first, then it offers it authorizes you, then you put in the password. And then it
logs you in. Okay. It doesn’t understand that there’s two different steps there.
Like so you need to put the username on page one. And the password on page
two? Does it doesn’t get that.”
Coping strategy when autosave fails - P1: “I’ll use the password generator, and
I’ll copy it from there into a notepad because I’ve had issues where the generated
password doesn’t go where I expect it to go. Or I even like lost it entirely. So I’ll
paste it over into Notepad, get my account created, make sure everything’s sorted
out in LastPass that the password and LastPass and the password I have in my
notepad that I’ve copied and pasted over, make sure they match. And then I’ll
close the notepad if they do or fix any problems if there’s a problem.”
Users blame website rather than manager for inconsistencies - R12: “And so
sometimes, if it’s if it’s not a super popular website, it won’t understand that this
is a password field, because there is no username field. There’s certain websites
that I actually have to just copy and paste the password because of that. And that’s
not really a fault of the password manager.”
User blames self for inconsistencies - R28: “Um, I feel like once or twice, there’s
been maybe like a glitch in like updating something or it didn’t. It didn’t get the
email down, right, probably due to user error on my part where I’ve gotten multiple
accounts, and I might save a password for a different email to the wrong account.
Maybe”
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5.3.4 Desire for single sign-on
Many users will use single sign-on on websites and especially in mobile apps whenever it is
available rather than creating a separate account. In addition, several users, such as R25
below, expressed a clear desire for a mechanism like single sign-on to prevent the need to
create and store so many passwords.
R25: “They always think we can remember all these crazy password amounts.
And like they tell you create a different password for every website. And I tried to
do that and I found myself like locked out of all my websites. So if there’s like
something that can be done to make it where the passwords can be simple, and we
can reuse the passwords on different sites, but yet, they’re still strong. That would
be like the best thing ever.”
5.3.5 Ubiquitous usage of default settings
Only one of our participants actually changed a default setting when installing their manager
on a new device and they could not find it during the interview. Even those participants
who checked to make sure a setting was enabled, such as default timeout, did not actually
change any settings (see R9 and P2 below). The name ’Captain Default’, which R13 used to
describe themselves, could aptly apply to basically all of our participants, at least in regard
to their password manager usage.
R9: “The settings? Yeah, usually I’ll just go through and just like, I’ll just check
things. Usually I don’t really change anything. Honestly. Yeah, I just take it as it
is.”
P2: “But honestly, I leave everything at the defaults. As far as functionality
goes. I do check this default timeout on browser restart. I like that to be enabled.
And it it is by default as of right now. But yeah, really, I don’t change much of
anything.”
R13: “No, we we call ourselves Captain default”
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5.3.6 Attitudes towards autolock
While more convenience oriented users felt having their manager lock itself periodically would
only be an annoyance (see R14 below), even those more security oriented users did not feel
autolock was necessary at home (see R11), or locked their device (laptop or phone) in order
to lock their manager (see R10 and R7).
R14: “That is a hindrance to somebody like me that works online all the time. I
can’t stand it, say for example, I get up and go to the bathroom or get a drink
or something. And then oh, my computer has gone to sleep. So I have to log in
again? I’m sorry, I just don’t have time for that. If I’m here, you know, it should
be on.”
R11: “I use it at work, I don’t use it at home. I used to use it work much more
often when I was in the office. Now that I’m at home, I still use it. But it’s
definitely not as prevalent. Because it is a good feature. It is good to have in case
someone is walking by and they can see a password. But because I’m in my own
house, and no one comes and sees me where I work in my home office. I don’t
need to worry about that security as much. But in a crowded office, where I would
normally be working. It’s very helpful.”
R10: “So I mean, in my house, who cares? It’s just me, but usually, if I’m not
using it, you know, I shut my computer, at which point it is locked. ”
R7: “I do have my phone has is locked. So there’s that level of security?”
5.3.7 How COVID-19 changed password manager usage
We encountered several participants who shared how the pandemic had altered their device
usage or context and, as a result, their password manager usage. R28, who normally unlocked
their phone using Face ID, was forced to enter their master password to unlock their mobile
manager when wearing a mask because Face ID was not reliable. And R11, along with several
other participants, mentioned that they did not use their phone as much because they were
home more often, which meant they utilized their phone manager even less than normal. R11
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also indicated that password sharing would be particularly useful during COVID because
he could not share secure passwords via sticky note and subsequently destroy them via the
confidential bin when everyone was working remotely.
R28: “I need to login more frequently on my phone - it locks I believe after every
use, but I can unlock it with my Face ID instead of having to enter the master
password. These days (after COVID), though, I do still use the master password,
because half the time I’m using my phone and I’ve got a mask down so it can’t
actually tell me who I am.”
R11: “Occasionally (create accounts on phone), not as much as I used to (before
COVID), but when I wasn’t always home. I would create accounts as well on my
phone (more often). But I probably do it once a month at most now.”
Interviewer: “And if your password manager allowed you to share your passwords
directly with another user of the same password manager securely, would that be a
feature that you think you would use?”
R11: “Definitely - because emails can be intercepted. And depending on how high
and the count is I’m trying to share with them, it would be easier that way. Back
before the pandemic hit, I would just write it down on a post-it note, show them
and then throw the post-it note in a confidential bin. We can’t do that anymore.
Because I don’t know. Everyone’s in a different part of the state.”
5.4 Discussion
In this section we highlight several areas where our work provides new insights into or differs
from the results of prior work, and then discuss ways to address the issues we identified in our
study. Lyastani et al. [41] found that password reuse still occured even among manager users,
and that the key to stronger passwords was using the manager for the entire password lifecycle
(creation, storage, autofill). In our research, we identified multiple reasons that users prefer
not to use their manager for their entire lifecycle that need to be addressed. In particular,
users considered generated passwords hard to enter cross-device and hard to remember in
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the event that their manager was not available, which resulted in them avoiding generation.
Users were also forced to enter passwords manually due to problems with syncing across
devices and experienced inconsistencies with both autofill and autosave, which encouraged
the use of easier to remember passwords rather than generation.
Our results also help explain why users of browser-based managers are generally more
convenience oriented and users of third-party managers more concerned with security. Users
often adopt the browser manager without any forethought. As noted by one of our users, ”it
starts using them”. In contrast, users of third-party managers usually adopt them based on
recommendations (either online or from people they know) or because they are required to
do so by their work. It makes sense that people who adopt a manager at work or based on a
recommendation would have a better mental model of how their manager works than those
who adopt it simply because it pops up. Another potential explanation is that only people
who are more security concerned are willing to through the effort to set up a third-party
manager.
Seiler Hwang et al. [56] reported that users changed at least some of the default security
settings in most cases. However, we found that nearly all of our participants used default
settings across the board. We believe this difference may be due to study design. They
prompted participants to complete the task of changing settings, which may have made them
feel they should change at least some settings. In contrast, we observed participants and
asked them to show us what settings they would normally change, if anything, and most
responded that they did not change any settings.
5.4.1 Reducing Multiple Manager Usage.
Users utilize multiple managers at once, but password managers are not designed to support
this use case. There are two potential responses to multiple manager usage: (1) Prevent
multiple manager usage by addressing the underlying issues that cause it or (2) Design
managers to cooperate better when used together. While it is unlikely that all issues causing
multiple manager usage (e.g. persistence of browser-based managers, unreliable syncing,
fears of not having manager available or the manager failing) will be addressed in the near
future, we believe that the best approach is to nudge users away from multiple manager usage.
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In addition to the difficulties of convincing password manager vendors to support multiple
manager usage, from a security standpoint it is detrimental. Browser-based managers are
typically less secure and fully featured than third-party managers [48] and storing passwords
in two locations leaves users more vulnerable to attack. We recommend the following practices
to reduce multiple manager usage:
(1) Third-party managers should walk users through the process of exporting credentials
out of their browser manager and then disabling the browser manager. Managers such as
LastPass can import credentials directly from the browser, but none of the participants in
our study used this feature. We also found that some users would sync credentials to their
third-party manager by first autofilling with the browser manager and then autosaving into
their third-party manager. And none of our participants mentioned disabling the browser
manager, even though some of them avoided the browser manager by constantly choosing not
to autosave their credentials. These results suggest that users are unaware of these features.
(2) More focus on making syncing reliable and helping users configure their manager across
their devices. Some of our participants were not even aware that their manager offered a
mobile solution or that they could sync between their devices simply by using the same
account, even if they had used the manager for five years or more. Periodic pop-ups reminding
users that they can sync across devices with instructions on how to do so if they want to take
advantage of that future may be helpful in this regard. (3) Alleviating users fears that they
may lose their passwords and offering instructions on how to back up their vault if they have
this concern. Giving users clear instructions on how to back up their data would hopefully
prevent them from resorting to multiple manager usage for a sense of security.
5.4.2 Addressing Concerns with Generated Passwords
Users often avoid using the password generator because generated passwords our hard to
remember when their manager is not available and hard to enter cross-device. The result is
that users resort to password reuse or creating weak passwords. Generators need to implement
modes to address ease of entry and memorability and they need to ensure that users are
aware of these features. Prior research has explored ways to make passwords easier together
on alternate devices [34] and more research is needed to find the optimal way to implement
126
cross-device password generation. However, we suspect that most users would consider an
easy to remember password good enough for cross-device usage, even if it is not optimized for
entry. As long as managers help users understand that they can generate easy to remember
passwords and this feature is easy to access, we believe that alone will encourage more users
to adopt the password generator.
5.4.3 Health Check Should Be Seamless and Targeted.
Even the most advanced users main use case for their manager is to remember and fill their
passwords. The benefits of features such as health check are not users’ priority and they are
unlikely to navigate to a separate page specifically for that feature unless they already self
audit their accounts. However, users are willing to respond to pop-up breach notifications
about accounts that they consider important. We therefore recommend that managers do
the following to increase the usability of health check:
(1) Use a pop-up to notify users when an account is breached or passwords are weak, but
give users the option to disable or change the frequency of these notifications via the same
pop-up. This operation should feel seamless to the user—almost as if it is automated. (2)
Develop an algorithm to identify which accounts are important to users or allow users to
indicate which accounts they would be willing to update. A pop-up asking users which types
of accounts they consider important (e.g. banking, ecommerce) may be all that is needed.




Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, I have analyzed the security of password managers across the entire
password lifecycle and contributed to the research community’s understanding of how and
why users use managers across their devices. I began with a security evaluation of generation,
storage, and autofill on the desktop (Chapter 3). We replicated prior work that identified
security concerns with autofill in the browser, as well conducting the first evaluation of
generation using a corpus of 147 million generated passwords. Our work found that while
managers had improved since prior work, there were still security concerns, especially related
to autofill in the browser.
Moving from desktop to mobile, in Chapter 4 I presented an analysis of mobile autofill
frameworks on iOS and Android. These frameworks are intended to provide a secure
mechanism for password managers to autofill credentials, but we found that in some cases
they actually enforced poor behaviors (such as filling cross-origin iframes on iOS) or left too
much room for managers to make implementation errors (such as app-to-domain mapping on
Android). We recommended concrete steps to make these frameworks more secure and noted
several framework smells that point towards potential problems with an autofill framework
(similar to how code smells point to problems with code).
Finally, in Chapter 5 I discussed the results of a semi-structured observational interview
of password manager users. The core result of this work was five theories about how users
utilize managers: multiple manager usage, cross-device entry and reuse, limited usage on
mobile, health check desired but overwhelming, and patterns in adoption and promotion.
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Multiple manager usage was a phenomena never discussed by prior work and we found it to
be a common pattern of usage (most often a browser and external manager used in tandem).
We also found that users tend to avoid the password generator because generated passwords
are difficult to enter cross-device or when their manager is not available. As noted by prior
work [41], users who avoid the generator are more likely to reuse or create weak passwords.
In addition, we found that users who adopt browser managers often do so simply because
the manager pops up, while those who adopt third-party managers (e.g. LastPass, 1Password,
Dashlane) often do so due to requirements at work or based on recommendations. This pattern
in adoption helps explain why users of browser managers are more convenience oriented and
lack as clear a mental model of how managers work as users of third-party managers [72].
Other results included theories related to adoption/promotion and limited usage on mobile,
as well as password sharing, mental models of reuse, inconsistencies in autofill and autosave,
attitudes towards autolock and manager security, and effects of COVID-19 on manager usage.
Below I will discuss key lessons learned while conducting this research and how future
research can begin to address outstanding issues.
6.1 Lessons Learned
Reflecting on the results of my analysis of password manager security and usability, six major
themes stand out:
6.1.1 Managers need better support.
Managers need better support from and integration with browsers, applications, and OSes.
Many of the security and usability challenges faced by manager users are not actually the
fault of the manager. The problem is that managers are working in an environment where
they are not first class citizens and functionality such as password generation and secure
autofill is not fully supported. On mobile devices, the problem is exacerbated by the fact
that managers have to work in multiple contexts (apps, browser, WebView) and cooperate
with mobile autofill frameworks that have their own flaws.
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6.1.2 Inconsistencies lead to reuse.
Inconsistent functionality (e.g. autofill, autosave, syncing) leads to password reuse and other
coping strategies. When users experience inconsistencies in manager behavior, they resort
to known strategies for password creation and storage, sometimes even abandoning features
meant to provide convenience and security. For example, when syncing across devices is not
intuitive users choose passwords that are easier to remember so that they don’t have to look
them up on their desktop when using their mobile device. Or when autosave and autofill are
inconsistent, users resort to manually entering passwords into their manager initially and
then copying and pasting them into form fields. Consistency is critical to prevent users from
falling back on known password creation strategies or using coping mechanisms are their
primary method to complete common tasks.
6.1.3 Usability issues prevent full adoption.
Usability hurdles prevent many users from adopting managers for the entire password lifecycle.
For example, because generated passwords are hard to enter manually and hard to remember,
some users avoid using the generator altogether. They would rather use weaker passwords
than be caught without their password on a device where their manager is not installed or
have to enter a complex, random password on their TV. To ensure users adopt managers for
the entire password lifecycle, usability across that lifecycle, including edge cases, must be
considered. Users will avoid a feature in order to avoid edge cases.
6.1.4 User concerns prevent full adoption.
Managers need to address user concerns such as the fear of losing passwords and non-
availability. Related to the prior point about usability and edge cases, managers need to
address the very real concerns of users. Users are concerned about putting all of their
passwords in one place. They are worried that if their manager fails and all of their passwords
are long and complicated they will be locked out of all of their accounts. And they are afraid
that they might lose their passwords. While these fears are not pervasive among users, they
need to be more directly addressed to encourage users to make full use of their manager.
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6.1.5 Inaccurate mental models are still an issue.
Incorrect mental models prevent users from experiencing the full benefit of their manager or
even adopting a manager in the first place. Even users who are concerned about security
may lack a clear mental model of how their manager works. For example, we had one
security concerned participant who was a retired IT worker and thought that a strong master
password meant their other passwords did not need to be strong. In addition, we found
that participants who promoted their managers encountered non-users who simply did not
understand why reuse was bad or how a manager would benefit them. There is a need to
find new ways to educate manager users and engage the broader public with information on
how to stay secure online.
6.1.6 Secure autofill should be a priority.
Implementing secure autofill should be a priority for both managers and researchers. Autofill
is a key security concern for managers both on the desktop and on mobile devices, even
though there are known methods to make it secure [60]. Several attempts have been made to
implement a secure autofill mechanism, but they have all failed to find widespread adoption.
Finding a way to implement secure autofill across devices that browsers, mobile operating
systems, apps, and vendors can all adopt should be a priority for the password manager
community.
6.2 Future Work
Based on the results of my research, I recommend the following avenues for future research:
6.2.1 Browser-Supported Password Managers.
Currently, authentication is a second-class citizen within browsers. Future research should
examine how browsers can better support password-based authentication—for example,
making password-based authentication interfaces first-class HTML elements that the browser
implements to ensure that passwords are handled correctly. This could include providing
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a common, recognizable interface for password-based authentication, allowing for the use
of alternative protocols (e.g., strong password protocols [7, 69]), and preventing malicious
websites from creating look-alike phishing interfaces [54].
Research should also explore how browsers can provide additional features to password
manager extensions. Examples include, (1) allowing password managers to generate a nonce
to autofill in place of the password that the browser will replace with the password when it is
transmitted to the website if and only if the target domain matches the domain associated
with the password in the password manager [60] (see Section 3.4.5); (2) providing password
managers access to the system keyring (e.g., macOS keyring, Windows Vault), giving them a
more secure and standardized mechanism for storing account credentials; (3) handling the user
interaction component of autofill and ensuring that it is clickjack resilient; (4) adding HTML
attributes that describe a website’s password policy, allowing password managers to generate
passwords that will be accepted by the website [59]. It would also be worth examining whether
such annotations could be automatically inferred and added by semantically evaluating the
code that checks passwords.
6.2.2 Helping Users with Cross-device Entry
More research is needed to understand how managers can best help users enter passwords on
devices where their manager is not available. We found that users often resort to weak or
reused passwords for cross-device entry because generated passwords are difficult to enter
manually and hard to remember. One approach discussed in Chapter 5 is to add an ”easy to
remember” mode to generators and encourage users to use it when creating passwords they
will need to use without their manager or enter on alternate devices (e.g. TV, Xbox). But a
user study is required to determine if users would actually utilize this feature and if it would
alleviate their concerns.
Another possible solution would be to allow users to log in to other devices using their
phone as a portable manager. The downside to this approach is that many users do not
use their manager on their phone, so this solution would require broader adoption of mobile
managers. In addition, users would need to understand yet another feature of their manager
when many users already lack a clear mental model of how their manager works.
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6.2.3 Secure Credential Mapping.
We believe that research needs to be conducted to design a mechanism that allows a domain
to indicate which webpages should be allowed to receive autofilled credentials. This would
prevent vulnerable webpages on the domain other than these login pages from being able
to steal users autofilled credentials, especially if password managers prevent autofill within
same-origin iframes. We believe this feature could be implemented similarly to how mappings
work for iOS Password AutoFill or DAL files, having a single file on the website that lists
acceptable URLs. Still, research is needed to identify the feasibility and effectiveness of this
proposal, along with the best way to implement it.
Research is also needed to protect against attacks that utilize WebView on mobile devices.
A secure mapping between credentials and websites should be enforced in the context of a
WebView and the app hosting the WebView should not be able to inject JavaScript into a
random website without appropriate permissions. In the case that an app is hosting their
own domain inside the WebView and JavaScript injection is desired to enhance the user
experience, a secure mapping between website and app should be required.
6.2.4 Research-Derived Character Sets.
Password managers generate passwords using different character sets, differing dramatically
in which symbols they allow and which characters they remove as unusable (e.g., difficult to
remember, hard to distinguish). We advocate for a data-driven effort to establish standardized
character sets.
User studies should be conducted to identify the characters that are difficult for users to
read and input, with attention paid to alternative input modalities (e.g., entering passwords
using a TV remote or accessible keyboard). Measurements of existing password policies could
also be used to identify which characters are commonly rejected by website password policies.
It may be that there is no one ideal character set, but rather different character sets for
different types of passwords (e.g., passwords with restrictive policies, passwords entered with
non-keyboard modalities). In this case, statistical modeling could be used to identify the
ideal lengths for passwords in various modalities.
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6.2.5 Autofill Framework for the Desktop.
Research is needed on creating an autofill framework for desktop environments. While
browsers do provide a platform to deploy password manager extensions, they do not actually
provide any password management-centric functionality—i.e., they do not assist with the
detection of login forms nor facilitate autofilling credentials. This lack of framework support
causes a mixed level of security for password manager extensions. Moreover, there is no
OS-level autofill framework, making it nearly impossible for passwords managers to provide
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A Evolution of Mobile Autofill
In this section, we describe the evolution of autofill frameworks on iOS and Android. In our
work, we evaluated the iOS app extensions and Password AutoFill frameworks as well as the
Android autofill service.
A.1 Autofill on iOS
There are five ways autofill is handled in iOS: copy and paste, in-app browsers, autofill in
browsers using browser-based password managers, using app extensions (introduced in iOS 8)
[2014], and using the iOS Password Autofill framework (introduced in iOS 12 [2018]).
Copy and Paste
Prior to iOS 8, non-browser based password managers required the user to first open the
password manager, select the appropriate credential, copy the username and password
(separately), switch to the target app, and finally paste their credentials. Not only is this a
poor usability experience, but this leaves users credentials at risk because other apps can also
access the credentials stored in the clipboard. While iOS limits clipboard access to foreground
apps, there is still the possibility that a malicious app opened in the future could access a
previously copied password. This can be made even more likely by having the malicious app
be a widget displayed on the users “Today” screen [6].
In-App Browser
One early approach taken by mobile passwords managers was to implement a fully functional
browser as part of the password manager app. While this approach provides the most accurate
autofill experience, it is less than unusable in that it does not help users authenticate to the
numerous other applications on the mobile device. While some password managers continue
to provide this functionality, it is not the preferred method for autofill anymore.
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Browser-Based Password Manager
Many browsers on iOS provide their own password manager, which can then be used to
autofill passwords into websites displayed through the browser. While this does work even
if app extensions or Password AutoFill are unavailable, this approach is limited in that it
cannot be used to autofill credentials into other apps.
App Extensions
App extensions allow a host app to interact with another app (e.g., a password manager) using
a predefined set of extension features. This approach requires both the password manager to
implement the set of functions associated with the password management extension feature
and for host apps to be updated to query this extension feature. Using app extensions is
more secure and usable than the copy and paste approach, though it does have two important
limitations. First, host apps are free to request passwords for any domain and it is up to the
user to ensure that only correct credentials are selected. Second, app extensions require the
modification of individual host apps, an approach that does not scale well. Figure 4.1 shows
the interface for app extensions, first requiring the user to select which app extension to use
(see Figure 4.1a) and the selecting the credentials (see Figure 4.1b).
While Password AutoFill is intended to replace using app extensions for password
management, we note that the password management extension feature is still supported in
iOS and remains functional in some password managers (e.g., 1Password, Keeper, LastPass)
and host apps (e.g., Safari, Edge). Additionally, for older devices that cannot be updated to
iOS 12, app extensions remain the preferred method for password autofill.
Password AutoFill
The Password AutoFill framework provides two major benefits compared to app extensions.
First, it automatically identifies login forms in apps and websites. It is preferred that apps
add appropriate textContentType attributes to form fields to ensure correct login form
detection, but detection will still proceed using a heuristic-based approach if these attributes
are not present. Second, Password AutoFill allows for a secure mapping between an app
147
and the domains that should have their credentials entered into that app. That is done
by having app developers include an Associated Domains Entitlement that indicates which
domains are associated with the app; the domain operator is also required to include an
apple-app-site-association file on their website indicating which apps are allowed to use
credentials for that domain. Figure 4.2 shows the interface for Password AutoFill, both when
an associated domain can be found (see Figure 4.2a) and when not (see Figure 4.2b).
A.2 Autofill on Android
While the evolution of autofill on Android is similar to that of iOS in its early stages, it
diverged during the development of a formal framework. Android took a less strict approach
in enforcing correct behavior than iOS, as described in detail below.
Copy and Paste
In contrast to iOS, Android does allow clipboard access to background apps [23], which can
leave credentials vulnerable to theft unless password managers clear the clipboard.
Accessibility Service
The first approach that allowed filling passwords into other applications was to leverage the
accessibility service provided by Android. While the purpose of the accessibility service is to
help users with disabilities, it has several features that allow it to be used to implement filling
passwords (though the developer recommendations do advise against using the accessibility
service for non-accessibility purposes). First, it allows an accessibility app—the password
manager in this case—to scan the visual elements being displayed in the current app; this is
used by the password manager to identify login forms. Second, it allows the accessibility app
to overlay additional interfaces over the current applications; this is used by the password
manager to have the user select which account credentials to fill. Third, it allows the
accessibility app to enter text for the user; this is used by the password manager to actually
fill the user’s credentials. One drawback of this approach is it does require the users to give
accessibility permissions to the password manager, which is not a straightforward process.
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Additionally, research has shown that relying on the accessibility service introduces numerous
security vulnerabilities [28, 36, 38, 46].
Android Autofill Service
In 2017, Android introduced the autofill service as part of API 26 (Android 8.0—Oreo).1
The autofill service was intended to provide OS-level support for password manager autofill,
obviating the need to rely on the accessibility service. With the autofill service, the OS
manages communication between autofill services, such as password managers, and autofill
clients, which are the apps that need to be filled. By default, the autofill service relies on
autofill clients to annotate their login interfaces using the android:autofillHints attribute,
though the autofill service does have several backup heuristics it can use to identify login
forms if the application is not properly annotated.
On Android, the password managers are free to style the autofill credential selection
dialog as they see fit. Figure 4.3 gives two examples of different UIs on Android.
OpenYOLO Framework
Around the same time the autofill service was released, Dashlane (a password manager)
and Google worked together to create the OpenYOLO framework.2 Similar to the autofill
service, OpenYOLO was designed to address problems with using the accessibility service to
implement autofill. In OpenYOLO, rather than modifying the Android framework itself (as
was done for the autofill service), clients (apps) and servers (password managers) are modified
so that the app can receive credentials directly from the password manager. The advantage
of OpenYOLO over the autofill service is that OpenYOLO is deterministic and allows an app
to specify which details it wants to retrieve from a credential provider. However, because
OpenYOLO requires more effort to implement than and was not designed to be interoperable
with the autofill service, it has not seen wide adoption.3.
125% of Android devices are unable to use the autofill service as they have not, and likely cannot, be




B Password Manager Download Statistics
In this section, we present the figures detailing app download statistics for the password
managers we studied on iOS and Android. On Android we used the download count from
the Google Play Store (see Figure 1). Because iOS does not provide detailed information



































































































































Figure 2: iOS Download Estimates from April 2020
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C Password Manager Browser Evaluation Results
To test browser autofill for the mobile frameworks, we evaluated the security of fourteen
different managers implemented with those frameworks. In this section, we given detailed
results for each manager using the evaluation criterion identified by Oesch and Ruoti [48].
Table 1 gives the results of this evaluation for iOS and Table 2 gives the results for Android.
Note that in Table 1 there is only a single row for iOS autofill, that is because that framework
completely handles the autofill experience for managers, and thus there are no results for
individual managers. In contrast, both iOS app extensions and the Android autofill service
allow the managers to have some limited control over the autofill process.
In addition to testing the various mobile managers, we also tested the password managers
integrated into several mobile browsers. While these managers do not use the system-wide
autofill frameworks, they act as a point of comparison for the managers implemented with
the mobile frameworks. These browser managers only work within their respective browser,
and do not support generic app-based autofill.
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System Interaction iframe Difference in fill form Fields Misc
Password AutoFill    # # # # # # # # #  # # # #
1Password      # # G# # # # #  # # # #
Avast      # # # # # #   # # # #
Bitwarden      # # # # # # #  # # # #
Enpass    #  # # # # # # # # # # # #
Keeper    #  # # # # # # #  # # # #
LastPass      # # # # # # #  # # # #










RoboForm      # # # # # # #  # # # #
Chrome #   #  # #  # # # #  # # # #






Edge      # # # # # # #  # # # #
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior # Insecure behavior
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System Interaction iframe Difference in fill form Fields Misc
1Password    # G# # # # # # # # # # # # #
Avast Passwords    # G# # # # # # # #  # # # #
Bitwarden    # G# # # # # # # # # # # # #
Dashlane    # G# # # # # # # #  # # # #
Enpass    # # # # # # # # # #  # # #
Keeper    # G# # # # # # # # # # # # #
LastPass    # G# # # # # # # # #  # # #
Norton    # G# # # # # # # #  # # # #
RoboForm    # G# # # # # # # #  # # # #










Smart Lock # # # # # #   # # # #  # # # #
Chrome # # # # # #   # # # #  # # # #






Opera # # # # # #   # # # #  # # # #
 Secure behavior G# Partially secure behavior # Insecure behavior
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D Android Credential Mapping Details
In this section, we give additional details on how password managers handled mapping apps
and the domain’s associated with passwords stored in the password manager.
1Password, Enpass, Keepass2Android, and RoboForm require users to manually
associate apps and domains. Of these three, only RoboForm warns users of the danger that
manual association can cause.
Avast maintains a SQLite database with two relevant tables. The domain info table
containes a list of 1,203 websites whose package names are a simple inversion of their
website address. For example, facebook.com is matched with com.facebook. If the first two
components of an app’s package name are in this table, then the app is considered to match
(e.g., com.walmart.evil is matched to walmart.com). The second table, alternate mapping
is a static mapping for apps that do not use a simple name inversion. For example, this table
maps ign.com to com.mobile.ign.
Bitwarden uses a simple heuristic that looks for substring matches between the domain
and the components of the app’s package name, though it does ignore components that are
TLDs (e.g., .com, .org). For example, com.wal.evil would match domains that contained
wal or evil—for example, walmart.com.
Dashlane maintains a list of 285 mobile apps, their associated domains, and a SHA-512
hash of their signing certificates. If an app is not on this list, Dashlane will not even offer to
autofill it. Unique to Dashlane, mapping behavior changes if the user turns off the autofill
service and only enables the accessibility service. In this case, instead of checking the list
of allowed apps, Dashlane uses a simple heuristic that compares the components of the
package name to domains looking for matches (ignoring common components such as com
and android). If a match is found, a warning is shown to the user informing them that they
are autofilling an “unverified app”.
SafeInCloud uses a simple heuristic that considers the first two components of the
package name and matches those against domains. For example, com.walmart.evil will
match walmart.com. While this does require malicious apps to use the same prefix as a
legitimate app, we have confirmed that it is possible to upload such apps to the PlayStore.
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Smart Lock maps apps by downloading the DAL files for the stored domains. It did not
allow a user to build an association between a website and an application.
Keeper uses a more complex heuristic to establish its credential mappings. First, it will
query the app store for information about the application. If the app is found, Keeper will
use the app developer website field as the domain for the app. If the app is not found, the
user will need to manually associate the app to a domain. As first reported by Aonzo et al [3],
this heuristic is vulnerable to attackers who lie about the app developer website, something
which is not verified when apps are uploaded. We verified this by uploading an app to the
Play store with the developer website set to walmart.com and checking that Keeper does
indeed offer to fill Walmart’s credentials into our app. We note that Keeper does show a
warning in this case.
Lastpass contains a SQLite database that maps apps and domains. Additionally, like
Lockwise and SafeInCloud it uses a simple heuristic that considers the first two components
of the package name and matches those against domains. Unlike those two, if no match is
found the user is then prompted to pick which domain should be matched with the app. If
the user does so, they are then asked if they want to share this mapping with other users. If
enough users share this mapping, it will be auto suggested by LastPass to other users in the
future (crowdsourced mappings). LastPass does warn users when they first associate an app
and a domain.
Norton includes a static file (resources/assets/theirdpartyapp.properties)
mapping 131 package names to domains. If an app is not on this list, Norton will not show
an autofill dialog, not even to inform the user about the lack of a match.
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E Observational Study Instruments
E.1 Screening Survey
Q1. Which password manager do you use?
◦ LastPass ◦ Bitwarden ◦ KeePass ◦ 1Password ◦ Dashlane ◦ Other
Q2. On what devices do you use your password manager? Select all that apply.
◦ Desktop PC ◦ Laptop ◦ Phone ◦ Tablet ◦ Other
Q3. Would you be willing to participate in a one-on-one Zoom interview with our research
group about how you use your password manager? You will receive compensation for your
time. The interview will be less than one hour and will be recorded. As part of the interview,
you will share your screen and demonstrate how you use your password manager to complete
several tasks. Your interview data will be anonymized and kept confidential.
◦ Yes ◦ No
Q4. Please rate the following statements about your password creation and usage. Options:
Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Always
◦ I do not change my passwords, unless I have to. ◦ I use different passwords for different
accounts that I have. ◦ When I create a new online account, I try to use a password that
goes beyond the site’s minimum requirements. ◦ I do not include special characters in my
password if it’s not required.
Q5. On a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all concerned to 5 = very concerned, how
concerned are you about. . .
◦ How concerned are you about institutions, public agencies, or intelligence services monitoring
your online communication? ◦ How concerned are you about website or app providers sharing
your data with unknown third parties? ◦ How concerned are you about other people getting
information about you without your consent? ◦ How concerned are you about someone
misusing your identity on the Internet? ◦ How concerned are you about other people spreading
information about you without your knowledge?
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Q6. Do people ask you for computer-related advice?
◦ Yes ◦ No
Q7. Do you know at least one programming or scripting language?
◦ Yes ◦ No
Q8. How often do you use the programming or scripting languages you know?
◦ Daily ◦ Weekly ◦ Monthly ◦ Rarely
Q9. What is your gender?
◦ Male ◦ Female ◦ I prefer not to answer ◦ Other
Q10. What is your age?
◦ Under 21 ◦ 21-34 ◦ 35-44 ◦ 45-54 ◦ 55-64 ◦ Above 64 ◦ I prefer not to answer
Q11. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?
◦ Less than a high school degree ◦ High school or GED ◦ Some college
◦ Trade/vocational/technical ◦ Associates (2-year) ◦ Bachelors (4-year) ◦ Masters
◦ Professional ◦ Doctorate ◦ I prefer not to answer
Q12. Please specify your ethnicity.
◦ Hispanic or Latino ◦ American Indian or Alaska Native ◦ Asian ◦ Black or African
American ◦ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander ◦ Caucasian or White ◦ Multiracial
◦ Other ◦ Prefer not to say
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E.2 Interview Sign Up Survey
Q1. Rate the following statements regarding device security. Options: Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Often, Always
◦ I set my computer screen to automatically lock if I don’t use it for a prolonged period of time.
◦ I use a password/passcode to unlock my laptop or tablet. ◦ I manually lock my computer
screen when I step away from it. ◦ I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone.
Q2. Rate the following statements regarding general security habits. Options: Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Often, Always
◦ When someone sends me a link, I open it without first verifying where it goes. ◦ I know
what website I’m visiting based on its look and feel, rather than by looking at the URL bar.
◦ I submit information to websites without first verifying that it will be sent securely (e.g.,
SSL, “https://”, a lock icon). ◦ When browsing websites, I mouseover links to see where
they go, before clicking them. ◦ If I discover a security problem, I continue what I was doing
because I assume someone else will fix it.
Q3. Rate the following statements regarding software updates. Options: Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Often, Always
◦ When I’m prompted about a software update, I install it right away. ◦ I try to make sure
that the programs I use are up-to-date. ◦ I verify that my anti-virus software has been regularly
updating itself.
Q4. Enter your MTurk ID below so that we can compensate you $26 after the interview.
Q5. Signup for an interview using this link: https://calendly.com/userlabutk/pwminterview
Q6. Enter the meeting ID that you received for your Zoom meeting in the box below.
Q7. Do you use a password manager on your mobile device?
◦ Yes ◦ No
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If you use your password manager on your mobile device, watch one of the following
instructional videos on how to share your screen in Zoom from a mobile device. Please make
sure to install Zoom on your mobile device and know how to share your screen prior to the
interview if you use your password manager on your mobile device.
Below are some resources that can help you get setup:






E.3 Semi-structured Interview Script
Opening
“First off, thanks for participating in our research. As a reminder, we are going to be
recording this session. Is that still Ok?” (If no) Let them know that unfortunately they will
be unable to participate in the study. You may now end the study without paying them.
“My name is [redacted] and I am a research assistant at the University of Tennessee. In
my research group we are trying to understand how people use technology to secure their
lives. Our goal is to create security tools that better meet the needs of users like yourself. In
this study, we are trying to understand how you use your password manager, [NAME], so that
we can improve it to better fit your needs. So the main goal of this study is to understand
the way that you use [NAME] in your life.
There are no right answers or responses. We really just want to see how you normally use
[NAME]. So just do whatever you would normally do. And if something is hard for you, that
is a problem with [NAME] and not with you. Our goal is to make [NAME] better, so any
problems you have using it will help us know the ways that [NAME] can be improved. And
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if at any point in the interview something pops into your mind that you think would help us
understand how you use [NAME], please feel free to stop me and share your thoughts.
“Now, let’s talk about the structure of the interview just so you know what to expect.
The entire interview should take under an hour. I’m going to start by asking you some basic
questions about how you use [NAME].
After that, we’re going to ask you to share your screen and show us how you use [NAME]
on your own device. To protect your privacy and ensure we don’t accidentally see any account
information, before you share your screen in the interview, we’re going to have you log out of
[NAME]. We’ll then have you login to [NAME] using an email and password that we provide
to you.
“Next, I’ll ask you to create an account on several websites the same way you normally
would in real life, except that you will use an email address I provide to protect your privacy.
The reason for doing that is that we want to understand how you use [NAME] when you
create and manage accounts. We’re not going to ask you to do anything other than create,
log in to, or log out of an account on any of the websites we visit. And we’ll be deleting all
of these accounts after the interview.”
Then, if you use your password manager on your mobile device, I’ll have you join this
Zoom call with your phone and you will complete a few tasks on your phone with [NAME].
At that point we’ll close with a few final questions and then wrap up.”
If you need any help sharing your screen with Zoom or have any additional questions,
please let me know. We just want you to focus on helping us understand how you use [NAME],
so just let me know if you run into any issues.
“Before we begin the interview, do you have any questions for me?
“Great! Let’s get started.”
Pre-interview Checklist:
1. Enable multiple participant screen sharing
2. Ask participant to disable webcam
3. Ask participant to log out of accounts on all relevant devices
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4. Verify participant is able to share their screen from all relevant devices
5. Start Recording
Interview
Generic questions about usage and login
“First, let’s discuss how you use your password manager on your desktop or laptop.”
1. “How often do you use [NAME]?”
2. “How did you pick [NAME] as your password manager?”
3. “How did you pick your master password?”
4. “Do you use anything in addition to your master password to protect your [NAME]
account?”
5. Do you ever suggest that other people use [NAME]? Do you promote password managers
to friends or family?” If yes - “What does that look like? What is your motivation for
doing so?” If no - “How come?”
(a) Do you know anyone who has adopted as a result?
6. Do you ever save your passwords anywhere other than [NAME], such as in Chrome or
Firefox?
(a) If yes - “Why do you use both? How do those two work together? Do you have
the same passwords in both?”
Account setup
1. “When was the last time you set up [NAME] on a new device?”
2. Before we continue, you’ll need to log out of [NAME]. If you need any guidance on how
to do that just let me know.
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3. Could you please share your screen now. Wait for them. Could you now login to your
password manager using the login information I just sent you over chat. Wait for them.”
(a) “Assuming you had just installed this password manager, would you change any
of the default settings before using it? Could you show us which ones?
Register a new account
1. “We’re now going to have you set up an account on Reddit. Have you ever used Reddit
before?”
(a) If no - “Alright, so Reddit is a social media platform where users share news and
custom content that they’ve created.”
(b) If yes - “If you are currently logged in to reddit.com, we’ll have you log out before
creating a new account.”
2. “Now, go ahead and navigate to reddit.com and sign up for a new account with the
email I provided. After we are done with the interview, we will delete this Reddit
account.”
(a) Now that you’re done, go ahead and log out of Reddit.
3. “Now we’re going to have you perform a similar task for ebay.com.”
(a) Now that you’re done, go ahead and log out of ebay.com.
4. “Do you ever experience problems when trying to save new accounts in [NAME]?”
5. “Do you normally store credentials for sites like Reddit and Ebay in your password
manager? More generally, what types of accounts do you store in [NAME]?”
(a) How do you store passwords if you don’t save them in [NAME]?
6. Thank them
Logging in and updating an existing account
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1. “Now let’s go back to Reddit and login”
2. “Do you ever experience problems when trying to login to websites that you’ve saved
in [NAME]?”
3. Now let’s say you need to update your password for Reddit. Show us how you would
go about updating your password for reddit.”
(a) If they seem to be searching for a password reset in settings, tell them how to get
there.
4. Now do the same for Ebay
5. How often do you update passwords?
Other common tasks
1. Creating a password
(a) “When you want to create a new password, how do you normally go about doing
that?”
(b) “Do you create passwords differently for different types of websites?”
2. Autolock and log out
(a) How often do you log out of your password manager? (desktop/phone)
(b) Does your password manager ever automatically log you out/lock? What is your
opinion of that feature?
3. App Autofill
(a) Do you ever use your pwm to fill apps on your desktop?
(b) (If yes) Do you ever encounter issues when doing so?
4. Sharing a password
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(a) “If you wanted to share a password with someone, how would you normally go
about doing that?”
(b) “Did you know that you can share passwords directly with other [NAME] users?”
(c) If no - “Would you like to check it out?”
(d) After showing - “Is this a feature you’d like to use in the future?”
5. Password health check
(a) “If you wanted to check if any of your passwords were weak or had been
compromised in a data breach, how would you normally go about that?”
(b) “Did you know that [NAME] can help you identify weak and compromised
passwords?”
(c) If no - “Would you like to check it out?”
(d) After showing - “Is this a feature you’d like to use in the future?”
6. “We’ve gone through using [NAME] to create and use accounts, as well as some
additional features. Are there any other features of [NAME] you use that we haven’t
covered? Can you show us?”
“You can stop screen sharing”
Mobile usage
1. “Do you use [NAME] on your mobile phone?”
(a) If no, skip rest of section
2. “What are some of the differences between how you use [NAME] on your desktop versus
on your phone?”
(a) “Do you create accounts for websites on your mobile device?” If so, “Do you ever
encounter problems?”
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(b) “Do you use your password manager to log in to apps on your phone?” If so, “Do
you ever counter issues when using [NAME] to log into apps?”
(c) “Do you generate passwords on your mobile device?” If so, “How does your
experience of generation on mobile devices compare to that on the desktop?”
3. If they actually use any functionality on their phone - ”We want to see how it works for
you on mobile. We’re going to have you join this Zoom call on your phone and share
your screen.”
4. Could you please login to Reddit now.
(a) Great, thanks. Could you log out of reddit now. This is the last we’ll use reddit.
5. If they create accounts on their phone - “We’re going to have you create an account
again. This time it’s going to be for memrise.com, a language learning platform.
(a) “Alright, go ahead and create an account for memrise.com”
(b) If they autofill apps on their phone -“Great, now let’s try using the credentials you
just created to log in to the memrise app. Please download the memrise app on
your device and login using the credentials that you just saved in your password
manager.”
You can stop sharing your screen.
Other remarks
1. “Thanks for participating in our interview. Before we wrap up, is there anything left
you would like to share that you think would be helpful for us to understand?”
2. “If there was one feature you could add or thing you would change about [NAME],
what would it be?”
3. If anything else you think would be helpful occurs to you at a later time, feel free to
send us an email at userlab@utk.edu.
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Explain compensation
1. We will pay you via a bonus on mturk
2. Let’s verify mturk id for payment - what is your full mturk id? You can just paste that
into the chat if that’s easier for you.
E.4 Consent Form for Interview
Overview
Research study title: Password manager usage interview Time commitment: Signing up
for an interview will take about 2 minutes; the interview will take between 30–60 minutes.
Compensation: You will be paid $1 for signing up for the interview. After completing the
interview, you will be paid $25 as a bonus to this hit. Requirements: You must be age 18 or
older to participate in this study.
In our research group, we are trying to understand how people use password managers so
that we can make them more usable and secure. As part of this effort, we are conducting
interviews with individuals regarding their password manager usage. Based on your answers
to an earlier screening survey, you have been selected to participate in these interviews.
What will I do in this study?
In this study you will conduct an interview regarding your password manager usage. This
interview will take place over Zoom. During the interview, we will ask that you share your
screen at several points so that you can demonstrate how you use your password manager.
We will take precautions to avoid recording any sensitive information during the screen shares.
You are not required to share video from your webcam during the interview.
Can I say ”No”
Being in this study is up to you. After completing the interview, it will not be possible to
remove your responses as we will delete any data linking your responses to you.
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Are there any risks to me?
We don’t know of any risks to you from being in the study.
Are there any benefits to me?
We do not expect you to directly benefit from being in this study. Your participation may
help us to learn more about password managers and how they are used, providing indirect
benefits.
What will happen with the information collected for this study?
As part of this study, we collect your name and email address so that we can communicate
with you. We also keep records of audio from your interview and screen recordings of you
using your password manager on your own devices. This We will keep and publish results
from this study, including quotes from participants’ interviews.
The information collected in this study will be analyzed to identify how to improve the
usability and security of password managers. We will record the audio from your interview
and the video from the screen recordings, but no other video data. This data is only accessible
to research staff at the USER Lab and the raw data will be destroyed at the completion of
our research.
These results will be published and possibly presented at scientific meetings. We will
clean this data to ensure that this data contains no personally-identifiable information. When
referring to participant statements, we will do so using an anonymized label (e.g., ’R12 said,
. . . ’).
Will I be paid for being in this research study?
You will be paid $1 for signing up for the interview. After completing the interview, you will
be paid $25 as a bonus to this hit.
Who can answer my questions about this research study?
If you have questions or concerns about this study, or have experienced a research related
problem or injury, contact the researcher, [redacted] at [redacted].
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For questions or concerns about your rights or to speak with someone other than the
research team about the study, please contact:
Institutional Review Board The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 1534 White Avenue
Blount Hall, Room 408 Knoxville, TN 37996-1529 Phone: 865-974-7697 Email:
utkirb@utk.edu
Statement of Consent
I have read this form, been given the chance to ask questions and have my questions answered.
If I have more questions, I have been told who to contact. By clicking the link to signup for
an interview, I am agreeing to be in this study. I can print or save a copy of this consent
information for future reference. If I do not want to be in this study, I can close my internet
browser.
Interview signup: link
E.5 Consent Form for Screening Survey
Overivew
Research study title: Password manager screening survey for interviews Time commitment:
This survey will take about 5–10 minutes to complete. Compensation: You will be paid $1
for your participation. Requirements: You must be age 18 or older to participate in this
study.
In our research group, we are trying to understand how people use password managers so
that we can make them more usable and secure. As part of this effort, we want to conduct
interviews with individuals regarding their password manager usage. This survey is intended
to help us identify potential participants for these interviews.
What will I do in this study?
You will answer demographic questions and questions about your usage of password managers.
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Can I say ”No”
Being in this study is up to you. After completing the study, we cannot remove your responses
because we will delete any information linking your response to your turker ID after we have
selected our interview participants.
Are there any risks to me?
We don’t know of any risks to you from being in the study.
Are there any benefits to me?
We do not expect you to directly benefit from being in this study. Your participation may
help us to learn more about password managers and how they are used, providing indirect
benefits.
What will happen with the information collected for this study?
The information from this survey will be used to identify potential participants for an interview
on their usage of their password manager. If you are selected, we will offer you a second HIT
that can be used to signup and participate in the interview.
Overall demographics and responses to the survey questions will be published and possibly
presented at scientific meetings. These results will be anonymous and no one will be able
to link your responses back to you. As such, please do not include your name or other
information that could be used to identify you in your survey responses.
Will I be paid for being in this research study?
You will be paid $1 when you complete the survey.
Who can answer my questions about this research study? If you have questions or
concerns about this study, or have experienced a research related problem or injury, contact
the researcher, [redacted] at [redacted].
For questions or concerns about your rights or to speak with someone other than the
research team about the study, please contact:
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Institutional Review Board The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 1534 White Avenue
Blount Hall, Room 408 Knoxville, TN 37996-1529 Phone: 865-974-7697 Email:
utkirb@utk.edu
Statement of Consent
I have read this form, been given the chance to ask questions and have my questions answered.
If I have more questions, I have been told who to contact. By clicking the survey link below,
I am agreeing to be in this study. I can print or save a copy of this consent information for
future reference. If I do not want to be in this study, I can close my internet browser.
Survey Link - survey link
Survey code Provide the code given to you when completing the survey:
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Vita
Sean Oesch is a security researcher in the areas of usable security, systems security, and
network security. His work at the University of Tennessee aims to make authentication
more secure by offering concrete solutions to problems with password manager design and
implementation. At UTK, he also explored the use of nation scale mobile ad hoc networks to
enable communication over large areas when it would otherwise be impossible, such as after
natural disasters or in heavily censored regions. His work at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
as a research scientist spans everything from using images of vehicles at stoplights to enhance
fuel efficiency in cities via machine learning based optimization algorithms to the design of
experiments to test the usability and efficacy of emerging cyber technologies in a state of the
art cyber range.
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